The minimalist conception of democracy as informed by the works of Schumpeter, Riker, and Hardin. by Thomson, Patrick Alan
 
 
The Minimalist Conception of 
Democracy as informed by The 
Works of Schumpeter, Riker, and 
Hardin. 
 
A thesis submitted to the College of Graduate Studies and Research  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the Degree of Master of Arts  
in the Department of Political Studies  
University of Saskatchewan  
Saskatoon, Canada  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright Patrick Thomson, August, 2007, All Rights Reserved. 
 
 
Permission to Use  
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Graduate  
degree from the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of this University  
may make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for copying of  
this thesis in any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be granted by  
the professor or professors who supervised my thesis work or, in their absence, by the  
Head of the Department of Political Studies or the Dean of the College of Graduate  
Studies and Research. It is understand that any copying or publication or use of this thesis  
or parts thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. It  
is also understand that due recognition shall be given to me and to the University of  
Saskatchewan in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in my thesis.  
  
Requests for permission to copy or to make other use of material in this thesis in whole or  
in part should be addressed to:  
  
Head of the Department of Political Studies  
University of Saskatchewan  
9 Campus Drive  
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan S7N5A5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I
Abstract 
 This thesis examines what has become increasingly classified as the minimalist 
conception of democracy, in an effort to define the minimalist conception, evaluate the 
contributions of Joseph Schumpeter, William Riker, and Russell Hardin, and assesses the 
impact on democratic theory of grouping these and other theorists together.   
 The idea that minimalist theory is a tradition of democratic thought which shares a 
common theme has been forwarded directly only once, by Adam Przeworski, and 
mentioned in passing by several critics, but has never been examined in depth or defined.  
Chapter one gives a brief survey of minimalist theorists and defines minimalist theories 
as those that conclude that any normative value found in substantive democratic 
outcomes is insufficient to justify democracy.     
 Chapters two and three examine the works of the two most influential minimalists, 
Schumpeter and Riker, respectively.  These chapters examine the minimalist aspects of 
both theorists and note that, in entirely unique manners, both reach the minimalist 
conclusion.  Chapter four examines the relatively recent works of Hardin, noting several 
similarities between his theories and those of Schumpeter and Riker.   Hardin is found to 
satisfy the definition of minimalism and make several unique contributions to minimalist 
theory, most notably by synthesizing Schumpeter's understanding of individual political 
competence with Downs's rational voter theorem.   
 In the conclusion, chapter five, it is argued that there is merit to considering all 
minimalist theories as a single conception of democracy as theories that contradict the 
minimalist conception, as defined in chapter one, often attempt to dismiss one minimalist 
theorist, but ignore the others, to the detriment of their work and to democratic theory in 
general.  
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Introduction 
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The normative value of democracy is of vital importance to the successful 
practice of democratic government, as any moral justification will imply ways in which 
democracys value may be magnified or squandered.  William Riker, for example, thinks 
that democracy is justified by, or that its value is found in, the individual liberties 
guaranteed by open political competition and that the institutional concentration of 
political power will undermine those freedoms and therefore devalue democracy.1  John 
Dryzek, as a contrary example, thinks that democracy should provide for the rational 
discussion of alternatives and the reflection of any decisions in public policy; 
accordingly, he thinks that competitive discourse must be emphasized in the public 
sphere and that a functioning civil society is vital to the authenticity of democracy.2   
These two theories conflict fundamentally and irreconcilably: Dryzek thinks that 
discussion and the popular control of government is the raison d'être of democracy, while 
Riker concludes that popular control of government is impossible3 and that believing 
otherwise leads to tyrannical government.4  If one theory were, unbeknownst to 
humanity, correct, then attempting to practice the others ideal democracy would lead to 
normatively bad, immoral, or unjustifiable governance.   
For example, Gerry Mackie, believing Riker to be incorrect, charges him with 
unintentionally undermining democracy.  After comprehensively refuting Rikers 
conception of democracy, Mackie finds that Rikers conclusions can be used to support 
undemocratic forms of government, stating that the alternate conclusion is that if 
democracy is irrational and fraudulent, then those with energy, character, and intelligence 
                                                
1 William Riker, Liberalism against Populism (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, [1982] 1988), p. 249-253. 
2 John Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 162. 
3 Riker, Liberalism, p. 238. 
4 Riker, Liberalism, p. 249. 
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should impose their interpretation of the objective public interest.5  As illustrated, 
normative democratic theories not only refute the correctness of opposing theories, but 
usually find that those theories faults will lead to democracys eventual demise. 
It is important to note, in order to understand the scope and severity of their 
conflicts, that normative democratic theorists are concerned not with situational or 
conditional judgments or justifications, but with the guaranteed normative value of the 
democratic form of governmentvalue that must necessarily exist when democracy is 
practiced, and is therefore intrinsic from democracy in general.   Most theorists, from the 
time of Rousseau to the present day, have sought to define and explain democracy as a 
form of government that is morally good, irrespective of any externalities.6  Even those 
who deny such claims, like Joseph Schumpeter, do not dispute the ability of democratic 
governments to be normative goods, but argue that democracy cannot always, in every 
situation, be valuable, or, synonymously, that democracy is not of intrinsic normative 
value.7   
Most theorists concede the possibility of opposing theories being circumstantially 
valid; Riker, again as an example, acknowledges that it is possible for an electorate to 
express, and govern by enacting, a collective opinion.8  However, as he finds that any 
collective expression may also be corrupted and/or irrational, Riker concludes that 
democracy as a form of government cannot be unconditionally normatively justified 
                                                
5 Gerry Mackie, Democracy Defended (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 430. 
6 Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, Charles Frankel, ed, (New York: Hafner Press, [1762] 
1947), p. 26.  Rousseau justifies his ideal form of democracy because the general will is always right and 
tends always to the public advantage. 
7 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, [1942] 1962), p. 
242. 
8 Riker, Liberalism, p. 235. 
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because it gives force to public opinion.9  He does not deny that, in any given context, the 
electorate could return a rational, un-manipulated decision, but only that this result is far 
from guaranteed.  This denial is a sufficient refutation of normative justifications founded 
on the democratic facilitation of popular control of government because these theories 
purport to justify the abstract and general form of democracy, not any specific 
application.  
Given the fundamental differences of competing understandings of democracy, 
Francis Fukuyama may have prematurely pronounced the end of history.  The twentieth 
century triumph of liberal democracy did not end the search for the superior form of 
government, but did, at least for the present, narrow that search to varying conceptions of 
democracy.  If democracy is to persist, and remain superior to other forms, it must be 
thoroughly understood and practiced wisely.  For this reason, the debates of normative 
democratic theorists, although rarely if ever seen as such, are of the utmost importance to 
the survival of the worlds liberal democratic societies. 
Recently, normative democratic theory has seen the emergence of a classification 
of theoriesminimalist democratic theorythat contains some of the most influential 
and controversial theorists.  This grouping of theorists, which includes Schumpeter and 
Riker, is not a school of thought or continuous body of work, but is a retrospective 
(posthumous, in the cases of the aforementioned) grouping.  As has been briefly 
mentioned above and will be demonstrated below, minimalist theories contradict other 
normative theories in ways that fundamentally impact the practice of democratic 
government.  Minimalism is a conservative doctrine that finds most arguments about 
democracy's accomplishments or entailments to be unrealistic, and that justifications 
                                                
9 Riker, Liberalism, p. 238-9. 
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based on anything other than democracy's ability to ensure the possibility of rotation in 
office actually undermine its legitimacy.  Despite this noted importance, there has been 
little discussion of, and no works exclusively concerning, a definition of minimalist 
democratic theory or the characteristics common to these theories.  
 
Adam Przeworski, the only self-identifying minimalist democratic theorist,10 
defines the minimalist conception as: a Schumpeterian conception of democracy. 
[Which maintains that] democracy is just a system in which rulers are selected by 
competitive elections.11  In doing so, he does not accept the entirety of Schumpeters 
arguments; unlike Schumpeter, Przeworski finds reason to unconditionally value 
democracy above other forms of government.  He concludes that elections, although not a 
reliable source of rational, representative, fair, or just outcomes, do guarantee peaceful 
changes of government and contribute to democracys survival.12  This synthesis of 
Schumpeters conception with Popperian justifications appears to constitute a definition; 
according to Przeworski, minimalist theories are those in which democracy is justified in 
a manner that does not contradict Schumpeters conclusions concerning the value of 
democratic decisions. 
Shaun McElhenny, an undergraduate student of Russell Hardin, provides some 
insight, but stops short of providing a definition.  He identifies Schumpeter, Popper, 
Riker, Hardin, and Przeworski as minimalists because their conceptions do not place 
                                                
10 Shaun McElhenny, Minimalist conception of democracy: a normative analysis, (Honors Thesis, New 
York University, 2004), p. 3.  www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/undergrad/research/mcelhenny_thesis.pdf  
retrieved September 2006. 
11 Adam Przeworski, Minimalist conception of democracy: a defense, in Ian Shapiro and Casiano 
Hacker-Cordon, eds, Democracys Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 23-55), p. 23. 
12 Przeworski, Minimalist conception, p. 44-45. 
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conditions on democratic outcomesthey must not necessarily be fair or representative, 
for example.13  McElhenny does not provide a definition because he is concerned with 
classifying existing democratic governments based upon their use of institutions 
consistent with the minimalist conception; he is able to determine which institutions are 
consistent with the minimalist democratic theories he examines without defining the 
concept itself. 
Albert Weale, though he makes no mention of minimalism, provides perhaps the 
closest thing to a definition of minimalist conceptions in his explanation of liberal 
constitutionalism, which he identifies with both Riker and Schumpeter.  He states that 
liberal constitutionalism, also referred to as protective democracy, [emphasizes] the 
capacity of electorates to turn politicians out of office, rather than [emphasizing] their 
capacity to achieve an expression of their views in public policy.14  As evidenced by his 
explanation, Weale, like McElhenny, is concerned with classifying forms of government, 
not the underlying or implied democratic theories.  It is clear however that the value of 
democracy, as envisioned by liberal constitutionalists, is found in the turn-over of elected 
officials and little else. 
Although he does not provide a definition, either, William Riker, likely coining 
the term, provides further understanding.  In the conclusion of his seminal work, Riker 
states that his conception of democracy may seem a minimal sort of democracy, 
especially in comparison with the grandiose (though intellectually absurd) claims of 
populism.15  This statement illustrates a common feature of all allegedly minimalist 
theories: in comparison with other, non-minimalist conceptions, they find relatively less 
                                                
13 McElhenny, Minimalist conception, p. 4. 
14 Albert Weale, Democracy, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1999), p. 34. 
15 Riker, Liberalism, p. 244. Italics added. 
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normative value in democratic government.16   By virtue of this characteristic, several 
theorists who do not necessarily draw upon each others work, or even address similar 
aspects of democratic government, have been classified as minimalist theorists.   
 
Still, within this seemingly general grouping, there exist several commonalities.  
Despite a variety of influences, approaches, and assumptions, conceptions that place 
relatively less value on democratic government tend to reach conclusions which are 
comparable beyond merely being relatively minimal.  Through surveying the works of 
Schumpeter, Popper, Riker, and Przeworskitheorists who find, relative to non-
minimalists, less normative value in democracyand the works of Dahl, which share 
several characteristics with these theorists, it may be possible to discern a definition of 
the minimalist conception of democracy. 
Joseph Schumpeter is the original minimalist.  Max Weber, who thought that the 
existence of conflicting values precludes a moral justification of political decisions; that 
the electorate possesses little capacity for political rationality; and that electoral 
competition is of primary importance to democracy, predates Schumpeter but is 
concerned with many other issues and does not draw conclusions concerning the value of 
democracy.17 Schumpeter, building upon these ideas, though not explicitly, develops the 
conception of democracy found in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy [1942]. 
Schumpeter finds that fundamentally conflicting values within societies and the 
lacking political faculties of the general electorate refute eighteenth and nineteenth 
                                                
16 Minimalist justifications of democracy are not refuted by other theorists, but are added to.  It is hard to 
think of, or imagine, a justification that denied democracys ability to prevent tyranny and guarantee basic 
personal freedoms.  So, while minimalists rely on the above points as justifications, non-minimalists add 
further points.  This is why minimalists are said to find less value in democracy than other theorists. 
17 David Held, Models of Democracy, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), p. 157-178. 
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century democratic theories, in which democratic elections are a means to discovering the 
common good or a public will.  According to Schumpeter, political decisions are so 
complex that individual electors can not be expected to devote sufficient effort to forming 
rational political opinions and are more likely to form irrational opinions or have their 
opinions manipulated against their own interests.  Furthermore, even if individual 
irrationality is overcome, it is unlikely, due to value-based differences, that individual 
opinions could be aggregated into a coherent public opinion.  For these reasons, 
Schumpeter concludes that democracy is not a means of identifying a public will, but a 
method for the competitive selection of rulers. 
Believing himself to have dismissed all theoretical grounds for finding value in 
democracy, Schumpeter concludes that democracy is not always valuable, stating that; 
There are ultimate ideals and interests which the most ardent democrat will put 
above democracy, and all he means if he professes uncompromising allegiance to 
it is that he feels convinced that democracy will guarantee those ideals and 
interests such as freedom of conscience and speech, justice, decent government 
and so on.  [This is because] democracy is a political method, that is to say, a 
certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at politicallegislative and 
administrativedecisions and hence incapable of being an end in itself.18 
 
 Insofar as he is not an unconditional democrat, Schumpeter differs from all other 
theorists to be examined; each of whom find some intrinsic value in democratic 
government, where Schumpeter maintains that any value found in democracy is 
dependent upon its satisfaction of external normative criteria.19  However, the central 
thesis of Schumpeters conception, best understood as a sustained attack on theview 
                                                
18 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 242. 
19 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 242. 
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which sees democracy as a means for expressing a popular will,20 does not necessarily 
conflict with other minimalist theories that find intrinsic value in democratic governance. 
 Karl Popper, like Schumpeter, was an Austrian ex-patriot writing during the 
Second World War who treated democracy briefly as part of a much larger work.  It is 
not Poppers dismissal of more grandiose democratic conceptions that causes him to be 
considered a minimalist, but his decision to support democracy over other types of 
government for its propensity to prevent tyrannical government, and for that propensity 
alone.  He states that democracy, as the only type in which governments can be changed 
without bloodshed,21 is preferable to all other forms of government, and that the 
various equalitarian methods of democratic control, such as general elections and 
representative government, are to be considered as no more than well-tried and  
reasonably effective institutional safeguards against tyranny.22  Although he does not 
dismiss conceptions of democracy based upon the intrinsic goodness or righteousness of 
majority rule23 on which he chooses not to base his defense of democracy, Popper 
makes statements suggesting that he found these conceptions of democracy untenable.24   
As noted by Przeworski, who defends his minimalist conception on Popperian 
grounds,25 and as can be observed in the works of others, the value of avoiding tyranny 
and bloody revolutions can be attributed to Schumpeterian understandings of democracy, 
in which the results of the democratic process are of no intrinsic value.  Schumpeter, who 
                                                
20 David Miller, The Competitive Model of Democracy, in Graeme Duncan, ed, Democratic Theory and 
Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983, 133-55), p. 137. 
21 Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 1 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, [1945] 
1969), p. 124. 
22 Karl Popper, The Open Society, Vol 1, p. 125. 
23 Karl Popper, The Open Society Vol 1, p. 124. 
24 Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Volume 2 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, [1945] 
1969), p. 160.  Popper states that Democracy can not be fully characterised as the rule of the majority. 
For a majority may rule in a tyrannical way. 
25 Przeworki, Minimalist conception, p.  23. 
 10
expressly finds no intrinsic value in democracy,26 conceives of the freedoms required for 
the conduct of competitive elections in a manner which renders democracy and tyranny 
compatible.27  However, these loose definitions are not fundamental to the Schumpeterian 
conception of democracy, as evidenced by later theories that maintain similar 
understandings of the value of electoral results but find value in democracys 
characteristic prevention of tyranny. 
William Riker, by basing his conception of democracy on social choice theory, 
developed an entirely original approach to normative democratic theory and ignited at 
least two decades of heated theoretical debate.  Riker attempts to study the relations of 
democratic means with democratic ends,28 by exposing what he believes to be the two 
prevalent understandings of democracy to the conclusions of Kenneth Arrows Social 
Choice and Individual Values, which proves that it is impossible to aggregate individual 
preferences into a single group preference in a method that is both fair and rational.  
Riker demonstrates that, in order to guarantee a rational outcome, all currently-used 
electoral systems are somewhat unfair, and that, in situations where an ideally fair 
electoral systemthe Condorcet systemwould produce an irrational outcome, different 
electoral systems are liable to produce different outcomes from identical groups of 
individual preferences.29  Although it rarely occurs naturally, it is possible for this 
situation to be created by manipulation of the democratic decision-making process, and 
                                                
26 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 242. 
27 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 242. Schumpeter states that disenfranchising and oppressing minorities can 
be decided on according to the rules of democratic procedure.  In his opinion, these rules do not prohibit 
such tyrannical actions.  See page 26 of this thesis for a complete explanation. 
28 Riker, Liberalism, p. 2. 
29 Riker, Liberalism, p. 115. 
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as important political decisions often have consequences sufficient to motivate such 
manipulation, it is probable that this situation occurs frequently. 
This analysis leads Riker to conclude that, as the results of any election may or 
may not be arbitrary, any value found in democracy cannot be dependent upon the 
coherence or meaning of election results.30  Instead, Riker finds that democracy is 
valuable because its existence guarantees the individual freedoms necessary to the 
conduct of free elections. 
Adam Przeworski, a self-identifying minimalist, constructs, with reference to half 
a century of democratic discourse, a conception of democracy very similar to that of 
Schumpeter.  He examines the possibility of democracys value arising from its ability to 
produce normatively desirable conditions, using the identification of social welfare 
maxima and the creation of representative government policies as examples.  Przeworski 
finds that the likely existence of conflicting interests within a society precludes the 
existence of a social welfare maximaessentially a common good.31 
Przeworski also thinks that the representation of public interests or opinions is 
beyond democratic government.  The absence of clearly defined mandates, the existence 
of dynamic conditions requiring mid-term changes in policy, and the impossibility of 
fully informing the electorate prevent the representation of opinions or interests by any 
democratic government.32  Przeworski, concluding that they can not ensure representative 
or social welfare maximizing governance, states that theories which value democratic 
                                                
30 Riker, Liberalism, p. 239. 
31 Przeworski, Minimalist conception, p. 31. 
32 Przeworski, Minimalist conception, p. 34-38. 
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electoral decisions for their satisfaction of other normatively desirable and politically 
desired criteria are likely also untenable.33 
Instead, Przeworski argues that the possibility of being able to change 
governments, and being able to do it by voting, have normatively valuable 
consequences.34  The alternation of governing powers, even if arbitrarily distributed, 
encourages rulers to act somewhat responsibly, as they can expect reciprocal treatment 
when eventually removed from office.35  Also, the prospect of regaining power in the 
future encourages defeated rulers to accept their loss of power and support continued 
democratic government.  The democratic alternation of power is significant because 
voting indicate[s] limits to rule;36 it provides insight into the limits of the electorates 
acceptance of government rule, ensuring that open revolt can be avoided. 
 
This brief survey reveals the existence of single unifying commonality; all 
theories examined conclude that any normative value found in substantive democratic 
outcomes is insufficient to justify democracy.37  Schumpeter and Riker provide the best 
known and most informative examples of this characteristic.  Schumpeter thinks that 
individuals are unable to form rational opinions consistent with their interests, and, 
                                                
33 Przeworski, Minimalist conception, p. 44. 
34 Przeworski, Minimalist conception, p. 45. 
35 Przeworski, Minimalist conception, p. 46. 
36 Przeworski, Minimalist conception, p. 49. 
37 It is important to note that, although minimalists are primarily concerned with electoral outcomes, they 
find no justifying value in any substantive outcomes.  For example, deep deliberative theorists such 
Habermas and Cohen eschew electoral outcomes but find value in the outcomes of public discourse, which 
they maintain to be central to democracy.  Minimalists, who think that individuals can not rationally 
represent their own interests or that the conduct of genuine discourse is impossible, also refute any value 
that may be found in this type of outcome. 
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therefore, that decisions resulting from their opinions can not be normative goods.38  
Riker reaches an identical conclusion by examining the process of deriving a collective 
decision from multiple individual opinions and decides that the realities of opinion 
aggregation and the probability that the decision-making process will be manipulated will 
result in manipulated or irrational electoral outcomes.39  Przeworski, for a variety of 
reasons,40 endorses this conclusion, while Popper, as discussed above, maintains an 
identical position but does not present any argumentative justifications.   
Several theories share an additional commonality.  Almost all theories examined 
find normative value in the existence of fair and competitive election. However, as 
Schumpeter expressly does not find intrinsic value in democracy, this idea cannot be 
definitional.  Riker and Przeworski provide the most explicit examples of this 
characteristic.  Przeworski, finding value in a modernized Schumpeterian understanding 
of democracy, judges democracys value to be found in the possibility of government 
turnover, a possibility guaranteed by the existence of free and fair elections.41  Riker finds 
that the conduct of free and fair elections requires the existence of certain individual 
freedoms that are themselves valuable.42 
Both theorists find some value in democratic outcomes; however it is of a very 
different nature than the value found by non-minimalists.  Przeworski and Riker value the 
potential for electoral results to cause changes in government, where others maintain that 
democracy can produce other desirable results, such as governments that aspire to 
                                                
38 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 253-264.  The point is stated as a hypothesis on page 253 and answered in the 
following pages. 
39 Riker, Liberalism, p. 238-9. 
40 See page 10 of this work. 
41 Przeworski, Minimalist conception, p. 45. 
42 Riker, Liberalism, p. 8. 
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achieving a social welfare maxim or common good, or representing the interests of the 
population.  However, although Riker does think that democratic outcomes can prevent 
tyranny and result in non-violent transfers of power, he does not think that outcomes will 
always produce such a result.43  He therefore does not rely on this possibility alone, 
primarily justifying democracy for its assurance of individual liberties.  Similarly, 
Przeworski finds that the non-violent alternation of power is good because it encourages 
restraint and mutual respect; power may or may not be transferred, but the potential for 
transfer produces results that normatively justify democracy.44   
Minimalist theorists find value in the existence of outcomesthe necessary 
production of winners and losersnot in their indicating or influencing anything other 
than the leaving of office by one faction and the assuming of office by another.  
Conversely, other normative democratic theorists find substantive value in democratic 
outcomes; they think that democratic outcomes can dictate government policy in a way 
that produces normatively valuable results.  To clarify, substantive outcomes are 
democratic outcomes which mandate a particular government action or policy; examples 
of substantive outcomes include referenda results, legislation enacted by a legislative 
body, and mandates that are often read into the election of a party or candidate.  Non-
substantive outcomes are, more or less, the defeat and election of opposing parties, 
considered separately from any perceived mandates or policies that may arise from the 
success of one party over another. 
                                                
43 Riker, Liberalism, p. 243.  He states that democracy only makes it possible to reject a putatively 
offending official.  This rejection may or may not occur and the outcome is only valuable when it does 
occur. 
44 Przeworski, Minimalist conception, p. 45-49.  This moderation is essential to Przeworskis valuation of 
democracythe bloodless transfer of power between tyrants could hardy be deemed valuable. 
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The theories of Robert Dahl provide an interesting and informative contrast to the 
above-examined minimalist theories.  Although not a minimalist, Dahl presents a 
conception of democracy that has influenced and been somewhat endorsed by both 
Przeworski and Riker.45  Like Schumpeter, whose analysis of democracy he finds to be 
excellent despite being somewhat defective,46 political competition is the exclusive 
focus of Dahls Polyarchy.    It is by virtue of this characteristic that he is referred to by, 
and on occasion grouped with, some of those considered minimalists.47 
Dahl reserves democratic status for an ideal system, instead identifying existing 
democraciesimperfect approximation[s] of [this] idealas polyarchies.48  Though 
democracy may involve other factors, any government in which citizens are, for the most 
part, enfranchised and able to run for public office is considered a polyarchy.  Dahl thinks 
that polyarchy is superior to less-democratic forms of government because open political 
competition necessarily guarantees certain individual freedoms, discourages tyrannical 
government, and encourages responsive government.49  
The responsiveness of Dahls polyarchy is not a direct product of the electorates 
expressed desires, but a result of the competition for political power.  Politicians adapt 
rhetoric, program, policy, and ideology to what are thought to be the desires or interests 
of [the electorate].50  The responsiveness of government policy depends upon the 
initiative of those holding or seeking elected office and the electorates reaction to the 
                                                
45 Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi, Democracy and 
Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 15. 
Riker, Liberalism, p. 132. 
46 Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 131. 
47 For example, Carole Pateman, in Participation and Democratic Theory, discusses Dahls polyarchy as an 
extension of Schumpeter.  
48 Robert Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 8-9. 
49 Dahl, Polyarchy, p. 20-30.  Dahl poorly articulates these values as six separate benefits of polyarchy. 
50 Dahl, Polyarchy, p. 23. 
 16
various alternatives.  The people do not necessarily hold or express concise opinions, but 
are able to rank competing platforms, which in turn are based upon the publics 
anticipated reaction.  Still, if responsiveness to the interests or desires of the public is to 
be considered valuable or good, the expression of the public interesta democratic 
outcome or productmust be somewhat valuable.   
While finding democracy less valuable than many others, this conception of 
democracywhich Dahls polyarchy is, despite his best linguistic effortsattributes 
more value to democratic government than any of the other examined theorists and 
clearly differentiates him from minimalist theorists.  As previously noted, while Riker 
and Przeworski also find some value in democratic outcomes, the normative value they 
attribute to substantive outcomes cannot provide a moral justification for democracy.  In 
Rikers case, democratic outcomes are valued because they provide the possibility of 
preventing tyrannical government, but are expressly not valued for any influence they 
exert on government actions or policies.  Similarly, Przeworski finds value in the 
alternation of powerin existence of outcomes, the electorates allocation of power, the 
outcome, may be good or valueless;51 the normative value of democracy is found 
primarily in the fact that power can alternate, and not in the specific exercise of that 
power.   Dahl, however, concludes that government responsiveness, which, despite being 
driven by the actions of legislators, is dependent on the value of public opinion, is an 
independent normative justification of democracy.52  
                                                
51 Przeworski, Minimalist conception, p. 45-9.  As with Riker, the outcome will sometimes, or 
circumstantially, be good, but intrinsic value is found elsewhere. 
52 Dahl, Polyarchy, p. 20-23.  Dahl does not explain why he thinks responsiveness is valuable and it should 
also be noted that he provides several independent justifications of democracy. 
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Dahls entire body of work includes several other moral justifications of 
democracy.   Assuming that it is desirable for humans to be moral beings, Dahl argues 
that democracy is valuable because participation in the democratic process facilitates the 
development of individual moral autonomy.53  This autonomy is developed by allowing 
people to live under rules of their own creation,54 a feat that is absolutely dependent on 
democratic outcomes being an expression of public opinion.  If democracy is to be 
justified for its creation of a moral citizenry, then democratic outcomes, electoral or 
otherwise, must be rational, meaningful, and, therefore, inalienably valuable.  
 Dahl demonstrates that democratic theories that focus on electoral competition, 
as opposed to welfare maximization or deliberative discourse amongst others, do not 
necessarily come to minimalist conclusions.  Both Przeworski, who defines democracy as 
a system in which parties lose elections55 or a regime in which those who govern are 
selected through contested election,56 and Schumpeter, who defines democracy as that 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire 
the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the peoples vote,57 think, 
expressly in Przeworskis case,58 that there definitions are minimalist.  Although all 
minimalist conceptions may conceive of democracy as a form of government defined by 
electoral competition, this characteristic is not definitional of democratic minimalism, as 
it does not exclude theories such as Dahls. 
                                                
53 Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989), p. 91.  
The value of democratically facilitated personal development is also discussed in: Robert Dahl, On 
Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 35-61. 
54 Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, p. 105. 
55 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and The Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 10. 
56 Przeworski et al, Democracy and Development, p. 15. 
57 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 269. 
58 Przeworski et al, Democracy and Development, p. 14. 
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Dahl also presents a further, far more reasonable, argument for valuing 
substantive democratic outcomes.  All minimalists deny the existence of, or possibility of 
identifying, a common good or social welfare maxima, a claim upon which most of their 
conceptions are founded.  However, the absence of a common good does not prevent the 
existence of inalienably valuable outcomes.  The value of democratic outcomes is 
unavoidably dependent on their rationality and coherence; if, as Schumpeter and Riker 
maintain, outcomes cannot be rational, then they cannot be of value.  Refuting the 
existence of a social welfare maxima, although a prominent argument of many 
minimalists, is not definitional of minimalism, again because it does not exclude theories, 
such as Dahls, that find other reasons for valuing substantive democratic outcomes. 
 
As thus far examined, minimalist democratic conceptions can be defined as: 
democratic theories in which any normative value found in substantive democratic 
outcomes is not a sufficient basis for a normative justification of democracy.  This 
definition provides for the easy identification of minimalist theories, but is only a starting 
point for gaining a better understanding the minimalist conception.  In order to 
comprehend fully the arguments, facts, and assumptions that contribute to minimalist 
theories, a detailed examination of the works of Joseph Schumpeter and William Riker 
will be undertaken in chapters two and three, respectively.  As the two most influential 
and divergent minimalists, their combined works should provide a comprehensive survey 
of minimalist positions. 
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 Although he does not directly endorse the minimalist conception, Russell Hardin, 
according to one of his students, certainly hints towards it.59  His works, Liberalism, 
Constitutionalism and Democracy, which conceives of collective action, including 
constitution building and democratic decision making; and Indeterminacy and Society, 
which examines situations where individual rationality it is dependent upon unknown 
conditions, address subjects that could impact upon the minimalist conception.  An 
examination of Hardins work in light of analysis conducted in the previous three 
chapters will be undertaken in chapter four, to determine the extent of Hardins 
minimalist tendencies and his contributions to minimalist theory.   Lastly, the concluding 
chapter will examine the minimalist conception of democracy in general, as informed by 
the three theorists herein examined. 
 
                                                
59 McElhenny, Minimalist Conception, p. 9. 
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Joseph Schumpeter, writing in 1942, produced a democratic conception that has 
not yet exhausted its influence.  Although he devotes only a subsection of his definitive 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy to the normative value of democracy, his 
arguments and conclusions helped to originate a school of democratic theory, and 
influenced countless theorists.1  Schumpeters understanding of democracy is the 
foundation of many minimalist conceptions, and his work is of continuing relevance to 
minimalist theory and democratic theory in general. 
Schumpeter begins his treatment of democracy with a refutation of the classical 
doctrine, which he holds to be the prevalent theory of his time, and which defines the 
democratic method [as] that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions 
which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the 
election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will.2  As he explains, 
this definition maintains that, in all matters, there exist ends beneficial to all people 
within a polity.  Accordingly, every reasonable individual should, through rational 
argument, be able to identify these ends.  The collectively expressed wills of the people, 
therefore, form the common willa unanimous opinion based upon the common 
good.3 
 Schumpeters many critics point out that his classical doctrine is not a fair 
representation of any democratic theory; it is an amalgamation of several theories, which 
does none of them justice.4  As is evident to anyone familiar with the works of both of the 
                                                
1 John Meadris, Schumpeter, the New Deal, and Democracy; American Political Science Review, 91 
(1997), 819-832, p. 819. 
2 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, [1942] 1962), p. 
250.  
3 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 250. 
4 Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 
p. 20.  
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Mills, Bentham, and Rousseau, this critique is a valid evaluation of Schumpeters 
classical doctrine; his formulation bears more resemblance to the worst excesses of 
democratic rhetoric than it does a coherent democratic theory. For example, it is clear that 
Rousseaus theory, like the classical doctrine, is not compatible with representative 
democracy. However, James Mill, J. S. Mill, and Jeremy Bentham each recognised the 
important role of representation as opposed to reflection.5  Nonetheless, Schumpeters 
argument is not impeded by this blatant oversimplification.  As Miller puts it, if we 
abandon (as we should) the whole idea of a classical doctrine, we are left with a 
sustained attack on the view which sees democracy as a means for expressing a 
popular will.6   
Schumpeter refutes this view using three distinct yet complementary arguments.  
Firstly, he finds the existence of a common good to be untenable: This is due not 
primarily to the fact that some people may want things other than a common good but to 
the much more fundamental fact that to different individuals and groups the common 
good is bound to mean different things.7  Within societies he observes divergent 
ultimate valuesconceptions of life and what society should be, which are 
irreconcilable because they are beyond the range of mere logic.8  These differences 
preclude the existence of a common good and, correspondingly, of a will common to all.9 
                                                
5David Miller, The Competitive Model of Democracy, in Graeme Duncan, ed, Democratic Theory and 
Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 133-55, at p. 137. 
6 Miller, The Competitive Model of Democracy, p. 137. 
7 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 251. 
8 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 251. 
9 Schumpeter also states (p.252) that, if a common good could be identified, disagreements over the means 
of realising this good could be as significant as fundamental disagreements.  Put another way, it may be 
possible to identify extremely general common goods, public health for example, but agreeing on specifics 
would still be impossible. 
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 Secondly, though democracy could no longer be associated with a good or the 
realization of ideal outcomes, the absence of a common good does not prohibit the 
existence of a democratic process motivated by a public willa rational public opinion 
devised from varying conceptions of good.10  However, Schumpeter finds that 
fundamental social divisions, which he attributes to modern social stratifications,11 will 
also inhibit the formation of a coherent public will; the probability of this corresponding 
directly to the severity of the divisions.   
 The attainability of a satisfactory compromise is doubtful; when the disputed 
issue is of a quantitative nature, allowing for gradation, a compromise may be possible.  
However, when addressing qualitative issues, any concessions would likely be equally 
distasteful to all interested parties.  Accordingly, Schumpeter finds it unlikely that 
political decisions produced from the raw material of individual volitions would 
represent anything that could in any convincing sense be called the will of the people.12 
 Finally, in the most intriguing and significant portion of his work, Schumpeter 
questions the motivation and ability of individuals to form rational political wills 
independently, by which he appears to mean opinions that are consistent with interests.  
David Beetham states that, if the idea of interest-maximization is to deliver a defence of 
democracy,... then it must contain the implicit assumption that people are the best judges 
of their own interests.13  Schumpeter argues that individuals are not able to identify their 
own interestsform rational willsand, therefore, that democracy cannot be valued for 
giving force to public opinion.  This last point is far more intricate than the preceding two; 
                                                
10Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 253.  
11 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 251-2. 
12 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 254. 
13 David Beetham, Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Democratization, in David Held, ed, Prospects 
for Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), pp. 55-73, at p. 61. 
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Schumpeter cites studies in crowd psychology, consumer behaviour, and Frederick 
Taylors The Principles of Scientific Management, before arguing that members of the 
general public lack the faculties to make sound political judgements and are therefore 
prone to manipulation.  
He provides two examples as evidence of the limitations of human rationality; 
Gustave Le Bons study of crowd psychology indicates that individual rationality often 
becomes compromised in group situations.  Also, economic studies of consumer 
behaviour indicate that individuals are not definite about, and often do not act rationally 
upon, their respective desires.14  Schumpeter then offers his own assessment of individual 
political wills, arguing that individuals can hold definite rational wills about issues 
distinguished by a sense of reality or familiarity or responsibility,15 but that, outside of 
this relatively narrow realm of expertise, the individuals feeling of responsibility and 
perception of reality become increasingly compromised, proportionately reducing the 
rationality of the individuals will.   
It is also important to note that, even in cases where an individual has formed a 
satisfactory will, rationality is not guaranteed; in accordance with the findings of Taylor, 
despite intentions of and pressures towards rationality it is possible for inefficiency, or in 
this case irrationality, to occur.16  Additionally, wills derived from the individuals 
narrow area of expertise may prove irrational by virtue of the individuals failure to 
understand issues beyond that area.  For example, voters may genuinely support policies 
                                                
14 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 257. 
15 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 259. 
16 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 258.  The principles forwarded in Taylors The Principles of Scientific 
Management [1911] are known collectively as Taylorism, to which Schumpeter refers.  
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granting them immediate and personal pecuniary profit, even if such policies are 
detrimental to their long-term interests.17 
Consequently, individual political judgements are prone to irrationality and 
misperception.  Furthermore, such weakly formed opinions are vulnerable to non-rational 
forms of persuasion, the function of which Schumpeter believes to be exactly analogous 
to that of commercial advertising.18  These methods of persuasion, like their economic 
counterparts, attempt to exploit subconscious impulses, create favourable or unfavourable 
associations, and produce public opinion through repeated assertion, as opposed to 
rational argument.  Further yet, political advertising, as it is termed, is infinitely more 
influential than commercial advertising, as it is impossible for individuals to 
comparatively judge political options in the same manner that a consumer evaluates 
products.19  In addition, the considerable incentive to distort information in favour of 
ones position ensures that a lack of reliable information aggravates the effect of such 
advertising. 
For the above stated reasons, individuals cannot reliably express genuine 
individual wills, instead articulating what Schumpeter terms manufactured wills. These 
wills are an insufficient basis for a conception of democracy founded upon the realisation 
of a public will.  As Schumpeter states: Ifthe will of the citizens per se is a political 
factor entitled to respectit must be something more than an indeterminate bundle of 
vague impulses loosely playing about given slogans and mistaken impressions.20 
                                                
17 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 260. 
18 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 263. 
19 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 263. 
20 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 253. 
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Based on his rejection of the classical doctrine, Schumpeter proposes an 
alternative theory of democracythe theory of competitive leadershipwhich defines 
democracy as: that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which 
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
peoples vote.21  This definition of democracy is consistent with Schumpeters 
statements concerning the inherent divisiveness, and rational political capacity, of the 
electorate, as it does not, in any way, involve a public will. 
Schumpeter believes his theory to be superior for several reasons, mostly for its 
correspondence to his observations of existing democratic governments.  He finds that 
what has been termed the elite conception of democracy provides a simple means of 
identifying democratic and undemocratic governments, recognises the role of leadership 
in policy formation, explains the tendency of democratic governments to satisfy genuine 
group volitions without resorting to unrealistic ideals, clarifies the necessity of individual 
freedoms to democracy, acknowledges the electorates interim lack of direct political 
control, and accounts for the difference between a popular will and a majority will.22   
 
Schumpeters central thesisthat democratic outcomes cannot normatively 
justify democracyalso encompasses the defining characteristic, the single common 
element, of minimalist conceptions of democracy.  While minimalists find no normative 
value in policy, or substantive, outcomes, Schumpeter finds no intrinsic value in all 
democratic outcomes; in doing so, his conception of democracy satisfies the minimalist 
definition of the previous chapter, as substantive outcomes are a sub-category of 
                                                
21 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 269. 
22 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 269-272. 
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democratic outcomes.  Also, Schumpeter is principally concerned with same substantive 
outcomes examined by other minimalists.  This conclusion is a fundamental aspect of 
subsequent minimalist theories and the most influential part of his conception, accounting 
for his impact on minimalist democratic theory.  
Briefly summarised, he thinks that, due to fundamental value-based differences, 
individuals in a society will be unable to agree upon government policy.  Also, it is not 
reasonable to believe that individuals themselves will have well-conceived wills; in fact, 
they may be induced to support positions against their own best interests.  Therefore, as 
actions based on the expressed desires of the electorate would likely be irrational or 
inconsistent with the electorates interests, no normative value can be found in the 
democratic expression of public opinion. 
Two separate but complementary positions contribute to this conclusion: 
Schumpeter states that there are irreconcilable differences within societies, and that 
individuals can not be relied upon to form rational wills.  Although his evaluation of the 
individuals political capacity may seem elitist to some, Schumpeters assessment of what 
he terms human nature in politics is more nuanced than it initially appears.  Though 
education and cognitive capacity are definitely important and mentioned by Schumpeter, 
apathy and lacking political interest are his primary concerns. 
Schumpeter does not think that most humans are predestined to lack the 
intelligence required to comprehend political issues, but that there is something 
fundamental to human nature or at least to existing civilisation which guarantees the 
prevalence of political apathy.23  His examples of a lawyer who does not apply his 
professional abilities to political facts in the same way he would a legal brief and of a 
                                                
23 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 262. 
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business man who is not bothered by government practices which he would rather die 
than suffer in his own office are particularly revealing.24    Schumpeter concludes that, 
without the initiative that comes from immediate responsibility, ignorance will persist 
irrespective of any effort to the contrary.25   
Their sub-optimal comprehension of political issues leaves the general public 
vulnerable to irrational forms of persuasion, which lead them to hold opinions 
contradictory to their interests.26  The effect of deception on normative democratic theory 
continues to be disputed, with contemporary proponents and opponents, such as John 
Dryzek and Adam Przeworski, arguing that deception is conversely mitigated or 
facilitated by the proposals of deliberative democratic theorists.27  The longevity of this 
debate illustrates Schumpeters continuing relevance; although his explanation of the 
political deception and manipulation may be dated, the issue itself remains extremely 
pertinent.  
Drawing upon the works of Wittgenstein and Gerald Dworkin, Emilio Santoro 
provides a contemporary revision of Schumpeters understanding of individual political 
competence.28  From these sources, he deduces that it is the community which 
establishes what is rationality, what a moral or political value is.29  The average citizen 
is not a party to the community of political decision-makers and therefore cannot 
                                                
24 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 260-2. 
25 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 262. 
26 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 263-4. 
27 Adam Przeworski, Deliberation and Ideological Domination, in John Estler, ed, Deliberative 
Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 140-60, at p. 141. 
John Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 
162. 
28 Emilio Santoro, Democratic Theory and Individual Autonomy; European Journal of Political Research, 
23 (1993), 121-43, p. 133-4.  Santoro cites Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations; and, Gerald 
Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. 
29 Santoro, Democratic Theory and Individual Autonomy, p. 135. 
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become familiar with the specific language of politics, as Schumpeter emphasizes, 
acquiring this familiarity implies concentration of a professional kind and relegates a 
mans other activities to the rank of sidelines.30Accordingly, the political actions of 
most people are undertaken using a rationality developed in a non-political context; the 
malleability of individual wills is not due to the electorates inevitable stupidity or a lack 
of experience, save that of being a member of the political community.  The applicability 
of post-modern theories of relative rationality and language to Schumpeters ideas 
confirms his continuing relevance. 
 Also, as discussed in Chapter one, it is apparent that Schumpeters conception of 
democracy differs from other minimalist theories as it does not find intrinsic value in the 
existence of free, fair, and competitive elections.  Instead, Schumpeter concludes that 
democracy is a political method, that is to say, a certain type of institutional arrangement 
for arriving at politicallegislative and administrativedecisions and hence incapable 
of being an end [or good] in itself;31 in Schumpeters opinion, a restricted franchise can 
be consistent with the democratic method and any liberal values are separable from 
democracy.32  For these reasons, he concludes that democracy is only valuable when 
these valuesideals and interests such as freedom of conscience and speech, justice, 
decent governmentare satisfied,33 and that in varying situations it may be possible for 
other forms of government to provide these goods where democracy would fail.34 
 
                                                
30 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 140. 
31 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 242. 
32 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 242. 
33 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 242. 
34 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 255. 
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 Schumpeter draws several conclusions concerning the practice of democracy from 
his normative democratic theory.  In order for democracy to survive, Schumpeter thinks 
that democratic governments must be run by high quality politicians and bureaucrats, that 
the effective range of political decisions must be limited, and that both the general 
population and political elite must exercise a level of democratic self restraint.35  
Although Schumpeter does not make the connection in every instance, all of these 
conclusions restrict the influence of the average individual, who Schumpeter finds to be 
politically incompetent. 
 In a successful democracy, individuals of adequate ability and sufficient moral 
character must exist in sufficient numbers and pursue politics as a vocation.36  If this 
criterion is not met, the government will suffer from weak leadership and, like the 
Weimar Republic, be vulnerable to anti-democratic leadership.37  Similarly, a well-
trained bureaucracy is required to execute the affairs of the state, instruct, and if 
necessary restrain, the elected governors.38 
 Schumpeter also concludes that the effective range of political decisionsthe 
governments jurisdictionmust be restricted.  The kind and quantity of matters that 
can be successfully handled by a government is restricted by the previously identified 
theoretical limitations of democratic decision making, by the competence of the 
legislators and bureaucrats, and by the attitudes and opinions of the electorate.39   There 
are some issues, criminal law and currency regulation for example, that should not be 
influenced by public opinion and so should be delegated to competent bureaucratic 
                                                
35 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 290-6. 
36 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 290. 
37 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 291. 
38 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 293. 
39 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 291. 
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institutions, and others, those on which people are unwilling to compromise and with the 
power to destroy the government, which must be placed beyond the reaches of 
government.40   
 Lastly, Schumpeter thinks that politicians and private individuals must voluntarily 
moderate the maximization of their political interests and be tolerant of opposing interests 
and opinions.41  In the interest of stable government, politicians must be willing submit to 
opposing positions without fully exercising their powers of resistance.  Likewise, voters 
must respect the division of labor between themselves and the politicians they elect;42 
legislators are liable to submit to the lobbying of their constituents, irrespective of its 
merit, and, therefore, electors must refrain from influencing politicians in-between 
elections.43  
 Schumpeter concludes that, although governments may deviate slightly from 
these criteria in practice, their general satisfaction is a requisite of democratic longevity.  
If they are not met, democracy is likely to produce poor governance and weak leadership 
and thereby become vulnerable to, and less desirable than, undemocratic forms of 
government.  Alternatively, if democratic authority is not exercised appropriately, 
democracy may collapse under the pressures of internal conflict.44  Schumpeters 
conception of democracy is fundamentally important to the practice of democratic 
government; if correct, his theories provide practical direction for those seeking to found 
or maintain democratic governments. 
 
                                                
40 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 292 and 296. 
41 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 294-5. 
42 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 295. 
43 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p., 295. 
44 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 296. 
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 The conception of democracy in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, based 
upon the assumption that individuals are not autonomous sources of political 
orientation,45 is of indisputable importance to both the minimalist conception of 
democracy and the worlds democratic governments and aspiring democrats.  Its 
endurance may be attributed to several factors.  Ultimately, it is likely Schumpeters 
commitment to developing a theory founded in reality, based on observable democratic 
practices, that grants his work a permanence uncommon to early modern democratic 
scholars.  This commitment, observed by critics and contemporaries alike,46 allowed 
Schumpeter to recognise the importance of deception and individual rationality before the 
topics became central to democratic studies, and ensured that his theory, unlike those that 
examine democracys theoretical possibilities, was and is applicable to the study of 
democracy in both theory and practice. 
                                                
45 Miller, The Competitive Model of Democracy, p. 135. 
46 Graeme Duncan, Steven Lukes, The New Democracy; Political Studies, 11 (1963), 156-177, p. 165-6. 
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William Riker, writes Iain MacLean, was the most innovative political scientist 
of his generation; he introduced analytical political science to rational choice theory and 
concerned himself broadly with grand questions, particularly those posed by American 
political history.1  In Liberalism Against Populism [1982], Riker evaluates different 
conceptions of democracy in light of developments in the study of social choice theory, 
particularly the findings of Kenneth Arrows Social Choice and Individual Values [1951].  
Essentially, social choice is concerned with the aggregation of individual preferences into 
group decisions.  As voting, being such a procedure, is seen by many to be central to the 
democratic process, this area of study could greatly impact democratic theory. 
 Though Riker and Schumpeter both reach the characteristic minimalist 
conclusionthat the democratic process cannot translate public opinion into government 
policythey do so through entirely different methods; Schumpeter is concerned with the 
political limitations of individuals, while Riker focuses on the limitations of combining 
rational preferences into coherent group decisions.  Through integrating the abstract and 
often mathematically complicated field of social choice with conventional democratic 
theory, or as he puts it, study[ing] the relations of democratic means with democratic 
ends, 2 Riker reaffirms Schumpeters conclusions and inspires several decades of heated 
democratic discourse. 
 
 In Liberalism Against Populism, Riker argues that, in accordance with Arrows 
theorem, electoral results may be irrational, and also that they may be manipulated.  He 
concludes that, as any given electoral result may or may not be fairly deduced from the 
                                                
1 Iain McLean, William Riker and The Invention of Heresthetics; British Journal of Political Science, 32 
(2002), 535-579, p. 535. 
2 William Riker, Liberalism against Populism (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, [1982] 1988), p. 2. 
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expressions of individual electors, electoral results are not consistently valuable and, 
therefore, their value cannot be relied upon in any moral justification of democracy.  
After reaching the definitional minimalist conclusion, Riker evaluates democracys 
normative value, and, unlike Schumpeter, who assumes that democracys normative 
value is determined by the intrinsic value of substantive outcomes, finds that, 
independent of substantive outcomes, democracy is a normatively preferable form of 
government. 
 Riker begins by establishing the centrality of voting to democratic government.  
With reference to a study of elements common to several representative democracies,3 he 
finds participation, liberty, and equality to be the distinctive properties.  Popular 
participation in government is an undeniably necessary aspect of any democracy: even 
recent theories, such as those from Dahl and his followers, that equate democracy with 
the free interplay of groups and the existence of an opposition cannot avoid an emphasis 
on voting as the ultimate way groups and oppositions make themselves felt.4   
Participation, however, is only democratic if it facilitates popular choiceis binding 
upon the government.5  The act of voting in isolation is a necessary but insufficient 
defining element of democracy; it must be combined with freedoms of speech and 
association and institutions that allow the act of voting to constitute a genuine choice. 
 Though there is no necessary connection, rights such as free speech, religious 
liberty, fair legal procedures, property ownership, and economic security are entrenched 
                                                
3 Riker, Liberalism, p.5.  Riker cites a study conducted in William Riker, Democracy in the United States, 
2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1964) 
4 Riker, Liberalism, p.5.  Riker is referring to Dahls A Preface to Democratic Theory, (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1956). 
5 Riker, Liberalism, p.5. 
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in many historic democratic declarations.6  Riker states that democracy and liberty are 
instrumentally associated, the latter being a necessary condition of the former: the free 
expression of political opposition requires potential minorities not to fear the wrath of the 
majority.7  Liberty has become an end itself, but originated as, and remains, an essential 
instrument of popular participation and, consequently, of voting. 
 Similarly, equality is an instrumental facilitator of popular government.  Identical 
valuation of each individual vote is fundamental to meaningful political participation: to 
permit serious inequality means to deny to some people the chance to the self-control and 
cooperative management involved in democratic justice.8  On similar grounds, this 
equality can be expanded to include legal equality and equality of educational or 
economic opportunity. 
 After cementing voting as the crucial aspect of democracys universal features, 
Riker delves into the meaning of democracy, which he states is both an idealself-
actualization through self-governmentand a methodthe process of participation in a 
free and equal society that results in the realization of the ideal.  He finds that there are 
two distinct interpretations of the meaning of voting, or accounts of what it may 
accomplishthe liberal Madisonian9 and the populist Rousseauian views. 
 In the liberal view, the function of voting is to control officials, and no more.10  
This perspective is founded upon a fear of tyranny and otherwise poor government, the 
prevention of which supersedes all other possible functions of democracy.  The popular 
                                                
6 Riker, Liberalism, p.6. 
7 Riker, Liberalism, p.7. 
8 Riker, Liberalism, p.8. 
9 Iain MacLean notes that, although Rikers liberalism can be sourced to Madison and Riker does not cite 
Schumpeter, the idea that voting is primarily a method of controlling officials is Schumpeterian.  MacLean, 
William Riker, p. 538. 
10 Riker, Liberalism, p. 9. 
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election of officials to limited terms is the exclusive purpose of voting.   Tyranny on 
behalf of the officials or the majority is tempered by the possibility of electoral defeat by 
other officials or a different majority.  Likewise, officials who fail to satisfy the electorate 
or become relatively undesirable may be removed.  Thus, through voting, the threat to the 
liberty derived from the democratic process caused by tyrannical or incompetent 
government is mitigated.11 
 Contrarily, for the populist, liberty and hence self-control through participation 
are obtained by embodying the will of the people in the action of officials.12  Voting is 
viewed as a means of discovering the will of the people, and liberty is comprehended as 
obedience to that will.  Although Riker identifies only Rousseau as a proponent of such 
an understanding of liberty, Robert Dahl, who thinks that living under laws of ones own 
choosing facilitates the development of individual moral autonomya normatively 
desirable resultis another such theorist.13   
The divergent understandings of liberty observed in the populist and liberal views 
of democracy are the source of their disagreement. Where populist liberty is a product of 
collective action, liberal liberty results from the restraint of such action.  Riker draws 
upon Isaiah Berlins Two Concepts of Liberty in examination of these differences.  Berlin 
identifies two distinct types of liberty: positive, realised through personal development, 
and negative, attained through the absence of interference by others.  He finds that a 
positive understanding of liberty lends itself to tyranny, as a desire for personal 
                                                
11 Riker, Liberalism, p.10. 
12 Riker, Liberalism, p.11. 
13 Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1989), p. 91.  It should be 
noted that Dahl also values individual freedoms, which is consistent with a negative understanding of 
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development translates into a desire for social progress which conflicts with a negative 
understanding of liberty. 14  Endorsing this analysis, Riker concludes that the populist 
conception of liberty is identical to Berlins positive liberty, and that liberal and negative 
liberties correspond in the same manner.15  Returning to the subject of voting:  
in the populist interpretation of voting, the opinions of the majority must be right 
and must be respected because the will of the people is the liberty of the people.  
In the liberal interpretation, there is no such magical identification. The outcome 
of voting is just a decision and has no special moral character. 16 
 
When applied to democracy, the positive and negative conceptions of liberty are 
related, respectively, to theories that find value in the popular control of government and 
theories that find value in restraining the powers of government.  Positive liberty, in a 
manner extremely similar to utilitarian welfare maximization, supports finding value in 
substantive democratic outcomes.  Similarly, negative liberty, as it contradicts positive 
liberty, supports finding no value in substantive democratic outcomes; in fact, if Berlins 
argument, that positive liberty is a cause of tyranny, is accepted, negative liberty provides 
an argument against finding value in substantive outcomes, even if they are rational 
expressions of the electorates interests.  Accordingly, Berlins understanding of liberty 
has profoundly minimalist implications for democratic theory. 
Having established the conflicting liberal and populist conceptions of democracy, 
Riker commences his central analysisthe comparison of these democratic theories with 
the results of social choice theory.  Insofar as it pertains to voting, social choice theory is 
founded on Arrows theorem, also known as the paradox of voting, possibility theorem, 
or impossibility theorem.  Arrow found that no method of collectively selecting between 
                                                
14 Riker, Liberalism, p.12. 
15 Riker, Liberalism, p.14. 
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three or more alternatives could both satisfy the accepted conditions of fairness and 
always produce a rational result.17 
Riker introduces Arrows criteria of fairness as a part of his exhaustive 
examination of electoral systems, and summarises them briefly.  There are many different 
formulations of Arrows theorem.  A concise summary of the theorem, as it pertains to 
electoral results, is offered by Mackie, a critic of Riker, who draws upon the formulations 
of Arrow, Amartya Sen, and Riker.  Essentially, Arrow theorized that no method of 
collective preference aggregation can guarantee a transitiverationaland fair outcome, 
which would satisfy all of the following criteria:18 
 
  1. Unrestricted Domain: Individuals must be allowed to select any logically 
possible combination of individual orderings as their preferencevoters must be 
allowed rank candidates or alternatives in any order they wish. 
2. Pareto Principle: If every individual prefers one alternative to another, then the 
collective choice must reflect this preference. 
3. Independence from irrelevant alternatives: The collective ranking of two 
alternatives must not be influenced by change in the ranking of a third alternative. 
4. Nondictatorship: There cannot be one single voter whose preference 
determines the result of an election irrespective of the preferences of all other voters. 
                                                
17 Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd edition (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
[1951] 1963), p. 59. 
18 Gerry Mackie, Democracy Defended (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 80-2. 
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5. Transitivity: A transitive, or rational, outcome is one in which there is a clear 
ordering of preferences, for example A>B>C.  An intransitive outcome is one in which 
there is not a clear ordering, for example A>B>C>A.19 
 
In the context of majoritarian elections with two candidates, these conditions are 
satisfied and a logical decision is produced.20  Unfortunately, most elections are contested 
by three or more candidates, and those that are restricted to only two candidates employ 
some form of nomination process which violates condition 1.  In elections with three or 
more alternatives, the majoritarian method is prone to the violation of Pareto optimality, 
and a host of other electoral systems are liable to contravene at least one of the above 
criteria.21  Furthermore, as each electoral system violates the criteria in a different manner, 
different systems may draw different conclusions from identical groups of preferences.  
Riker contends that this fact results in the choice of electoral system, rather than the 
preferences of electors, often determining election outcomes.22 
Of the comprehensive list of electoral systems that Riker examines, there is only 
one that guarantees the satisfaction of the fairness criteria, but cannot guarantee a 
rationaltransitiveresult: the Condorcet system.  In this system, the winning candidate, 
or Condorcet winner, must be preferred to all other candidates in a series of pairwise 
majority contests; essentially, it extends majoritarian decision-making with two 
alternatives into situations with three or more alternatives.23  Unfortunately, it is possible 
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that no candidate is preferred to all others in pairwise comparisons, and, therefore, that 
there is no Condorcet winner.  In other methods, violating the principles of fairness 
ensures the production of a rational resultthe selection of a winnereven if a 
Condorcet winner does not exist.24 
Unlike all other systems, which violate the criteria of fairness but produce a 
rational result, the Condorcet system satisfies Arrows criteria of fairness but is not 
guaranteed to return a rational decision.25  In the event of a Condorcet cycle, every 
candidate is defeated by at least one other candidate in pairwise comparisons; there is no 
winning candidate.  The lapse in the transitivity of aggregated preferencesrationality
that occurs when the fairness criteria are satisfied is central to Arrows theorem and to 
Rikers conception of democracy.   
The probability of Condorcet cycling is vital to social choice theorys impact on 
democratic theory.  If cycles are extremely unlikely to occur in democratic elections and 
decision-making processes, then Arrows theorem is of little relevance.  Alternatively, if 
cycles occur with reasonable frequency, the theorem is significant to democratic theory, 
and, as democratic outcomes can not be valuable if they are not fair and rational, 
significant cycling supports a minimalist understanding of democracy. 
Riker observes that, assuming a random distribution of preferences, the 
probability of cycling increases with greater numbers of voters and candidates, to the 
point where cycling could be expected to occur in most situations.  Such estimates are 
unreliable, however, as there is good reason to believe that debate and discussion do 
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lead to fundamental similarities in judgement.26  Riker concludes that the tendency 
towards similarity may thus reduce [the probability of cycling], while the possibility of 
manipulation may increase [the probability of cycling].27 
With reference to the works of Duncan Black,28 Riker notes that when the 
aggregated preferences produce a single preference peak, then transitivity, and therefore a 
Condorcet winner, are guaranteed.  Single-peakedness29 occurs when decisions are made 
in a single political dimension, when all individual voters order candidates along the 
same spectrum,30 only disagreeing over the merits of each point on that spectrum.  These 
findings, and those of Peter Fishburn,31 lead Riker to conclude that: 
because of agreement on an issue dimension, intransitivities only occasionally 
render decisions by majoritarian methods meaningless, at least for somewhat 
homogeneous groups and at least when the subjects for decision are not politically 
important.  When, on the other hand, subjects are politically important enough to 
justify the energy and expense of contriving cycles, Arrows result is of great 
practical significance.32 
 
 While naturally occurring cycles may not, according to Riker, occur with any 
significant frequency, it is possible for cycles to be manufactured through various forms 
of manipulation.  Because they can induce Condorcet cycles, strategic voting and agenda 
manipulation can be used to alter democratic outcomes in the election of representative, 
referenda, and the decisions of legislative bodies.  Such practices can be observed in 
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historical democratic decisions and explain the political histories of democratic 
countries.33 
 Riker demonstrates how strategic voting can and has been used to induce cycling 
and impose the will of minorities.  In his examination of this phenomenon, Riker 
acknowledges that strategic voting in plurality elections is a form of manipulation.  
Although, in fact, it offsets Condorcet inefficiencies, caused by vote splitting, in simple 
plurality elections; if, in a three party race, two parties ally to defeat a third, mutually 
disliked opponent, it necessarily follows that the defeated candidate was not the 
Condorcet winnerable to defeat all other candidates in pairwise comparisonsand the 
victorious candidate is probably, though not necessarily, the Condorcet winner, if in fact 
there is a Condorcet winner.34  He does, however, maintain that such strategic voting 
constitutes manipulation. 
 Riker correctly concludes that in more complex situations, strategic voting can be 
manipulative.  Notably in American primaries, but also in other candidate nomination 
processes, it is not uncommon for opponents to vote in a competing partys primary
representative, senatorial, or presidentialfor their least favourite candidate, believing 
that this candidate would lose to their candidate in the election.  In this case, the strategic 
voters act disingenuously to remove a potential Condorcet winner from the final 
competition.35 
 Rikers best example is drawn from the legislative process.  In what does not 
sound like an uncommon scenario, opponents of a billa 1956 federal education funding 
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34 Riker, Liberalism, p. 145. 
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billvoted for and passed an amendment they did not supportone which would restrict 
funding to desegregated schoolsto affect the defeat of the entire bill.  Effectively, there 
were three options placed before the House of Representatives; fund all schools, fund 
desegregated schools, or continue not to fund education.36   Though the absence of 
complete records of preferences precludes certainty, it is probable that the unamended 
bill, which would federally fund all schools, was favoured by the majority of 
Representatives over both alternatives, therefore being the Condorcet winner. 37 But, by 
strategically supporting the amendment, which would restrict the funding to desegregated 
schools, opponents of federal education funding were able to eliminate the Condorcet 
winner, precipitating the victory of their minority position.  In the words of former 
President Truman, Congress [fell] into the trap which the Republican leadership [had] 
thus set.38  As a majority of Congressmen favoured federally funding all schools and this 
action did not result from the democratic decision-making process, the democratic 
outcome was not the will of Congress; therefore, the decision did not make Congress free 
by virtue of self-control, and cannot be normatively justifiably by a populist, or positive, 
understanding of liberty. 
 Strategic voting, including vote trading or log rolling, inevitably occurs in every 
electoral system and legislative process.  Though it can result, or be intended to result, in 
the selection of the Condorcet winner, it is also used to inhibit the Condorcet efficiency 
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of democratic decision-making processes, making an election more a game of skill than 
a real test of the wishes of electors.39 
 Agenda control, Rikers other form of manipulation, is divided into two 
subcategories, one in which those controlling the sequence of decisions manipulate the 
outcome, the other in which the minority introduces new elements into a decision, 
resulting in the formation of a different majority.40  Like the other type of manipulation, 
agenda control is most prevalent, productive, and obvious in legislative bodies.  Both 
arise from a losing partys inability to accept defeat, and when combined create a 
dynamic and malleable environment in which honesty and insincerity are not easily 
discerned. 
 Drawing upon the exploits of Pliny the Younger and a social experiment of 
Charles Plott and Michael Levine,41 Riker shows how those controlling the sequences of 
decisions can affect the outcome.  Pliny, for example, seeking acquittal in, and presiding 
over, a murder trial, put three optionsacquittal, exile, and deathbefore the Senate, 
instead of first holding a guilty/innocent vote, because Pliny knew that a plurality but not 
majority of Senators favoured acquittal.  Had his manipulation gone unnoticed, the 
suspects would likely have been acquitted.42  However, those preferring death voted 
strategically for exile, affecting the selection of the clear Condorcet winner.  If Plinys 
manipulation had succeeded, the Senates decision could not be justified by the positive 
conception of liberty.  In the modern era, Pliny is replaced by institutions such as the 
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House Rules Committee or the Prime Ministers Office, but the nature of agenda setting 
remains unchanged.   
 As an aside, Riker is concerned with agenda setting through manipulation of the 
procedures used to make democratic decisions.  Many academics have observed another 
type of agenda setting, in which the relative importance of political issues to the general 
public is influenced by media coverage; in other words, the news media may not be 
successful in telling people what to think, but they are stunningly successful in telling 
their audience what to think about.43  Although this phenomenon is largely an 
unintentional by-product of news reporting,44 it could foreseeably be intentionally 
induced.  This type of agenda setting is not that applicable to Rikers work, as he focuses 
on the aggregation of public opinion, not its formation, but it does corroborate 
Schumpeters assessment of the malleability of public opinion. 
 From the results of Arrows theorem and the ensuing manipulation, Riker 
develops an explanation of political progress, stating that: the force for evolution is 
political disequilibrium, and the consequence of disequilibrium is a kind of natural 
selection of issues.45  Decisions resulting from a democratic process result from the 
formation of a majority; this majority is not permanent, however, as the dissatisfied 
minority will eventually introduce issues that will divide the established majority and 
precipitate the formation of a different majority.  This continuous succession of shifting 
majorities and inherent absence of equilibrium results in political outcomes depending 
more upon the resources and ingenuity of the involved factions than on the opinions and 
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interests of the general electorate.  The manipulative imposition of minority positions 
ensures, in such instances, that the majority is in fact dissatisfied.46   
 In this political model, leaders competitively create opposing policies and 
political dimensions in efforts to gain the support of a majority; essentially, leaders or 
parties compete in a political market place, the relative merits of their platforms 
determining the victor.  However, Riker notes that in most situations the absence of an 
observable connection between actions and outcomes results in political competition 
being far from comparable to economic competition.47  He concludes, based on his 
assessment of democracy, that:  
The world of political issues can thus be better compared to the world of organic 
nature than to markets.  New issues are produced, more or less randomly, just as 
genetic recombinations are constantly produced, more or less randomly.  Some 
few of the animal and vegetable recombinations find a niche in the environment 
and survive and flourish; most of the recombinations fail.  So it is also with issues.  
Most find no significant audience and fail; but some are responded to 
enthusiastically and flourish, even to the point of completely reshaping the 
environment in which they arose.48  
 
 The infinite number of variables present in such a system renders concrete future 
predictions impossible, though the evolution of current and past issues can be determined 
in hindsight.49  Factors influencing this natural selection, institutions and constitutions for 
example, can be identified and assessed.  But the fate and impact of an individual issue 
can not be projected.  
In summation, Riker draws two conclusions about voting from his examination of 
social choice theory: 
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Outcomes of voting cannot, in general, be regarded as accurate amalgamations of 
voters values.  Sometimes they may be accurate, sometimes not; but since we 
seldom know which situations exist, we cannot, in general, expect accuracy.  
Hence we cannot expect fairness either.50 
[And] outcomes of any particular method of voting lack meaning because often 
they are manipulated amalgamations rather than fair and true amalgamations of 
voters judgments and because we can never know for certain whether an 
amalgamation has in fact been manipulated.51 
 
 In light of these findings, Riker assesses the tenability of the two conflicting 
interpretations of votingliberalism and populismdefined at the beginning of the work.  
As foreshadowed by the title, he determines that the populist understanding, which 
maintains that popular desires should direct government actions and that this collective 
sovereignty results in liberty, is irreconcilably at odds with the realities of social choice 
theory: if we do not know the peoples wishes, then we can not make them free by 
enacting their wishes.52  The realisation of populist liberty is dependent upon the 
fulfillment of the peoples wishes, which Riker contends are obscured sufficiently to 
render the populist ideal literally unattainable;53  the populist ideal is untenable because 
electoral resultsdemocratic outcomesare not reliable enough foundation for a 
normative justification of democracy.54 
Conversely, Riker decides that the liberal interpretation of democracy is not 
precluded by social choice theory, stating that: 
Populism is supposed to reveal a substantive will, a proposition with content.  Yet 
if voting can fail to reveal such propositions accurately and if we do not and 
cannot know in any particular instance whether failure has occurred, then none of 
the propositions supposedly revealed can be believed.  Liberalism on the other 
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hand asks only for a workable procedurenamely, that voting eliminate some 
offendersand if it works sometimes, that is enough.55 
 
As it requires only that voters have the ability to restrain officials, the possibility 
of the democratic processes failing to select a favoured candidatea Condorcet winner
or even, through manipulation or ignorance, approving a popularly disliked incumbent or 
policy alternativeboth Condorcet losersdoes not contradict Rikers liberal conception 
of democracy, which requires only that rulers can be removed by a decision of the 
electorate, not that the decision be fair, just, or meaningful in any way.  Riker concedes 
that liberalism provides for a minimal sort of democracy, especially in comparison with 
the grandiose (though intellectually absurd) claims of populism, but maintains that it is a 
normatively justifiable form of government.56  Social choice theory does not inhibit the 
participatory rights, equality, or liberty of a liberal democracy; they are a required 
element of democratic competition and, therefore, guaranteed by the existence of 
democratic government, not by the results of that governments democratic processes. 
Rikers conception of democracy, inclusive of all above theories, is best 
understood through examination of his cardinal and favourite example: the issue of 
slavery as a prelude to the American Civil War.  Prior to the war, 19th-century America 
was predominantly governed by a hardy intersectional coalition of agrarian 
expansionism.57  This coalition of Jacksonian Democracy and Jeffersonian 
Republicanism included both proponents and opponents of slavery, and survived largely 
by ignoring the issue and accepting the status quo.   Industrialists constituted a minority 
during this period, and their interests directly opposed those of the agrarian majority on 
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issues such trade tariffs, which would benefit industrial development and harm 
commercial agriculture if stringent, and vice versa if lenient.  
 In this context, Riker interprets the developments surrounding an 1819 Bill 
admitting Missouri to the union and a subsequent amendment that would have banned 
slavery in the state as an attempt to divide the majority by introducing a new political 
dimension.58  Slavery became, for the first time, a significant national issue; the resulting 
Missouri Compromise, which allowed slavery in the state but prohibited it in the rest of 
the Northern Louisiana Purchase, preserved the majority coalition while revealing the 
potential potency of the slavery issue. 
 The issue was not raised again until near the end of the Jackson administration, 
when it was revived following the failure of other attempts to divide the large Jacksonian 
coalition.  Riker rejects the commonly accepted explanation of the issue as a product of 
secularising religious enthusiasm, citing the absence of such sentiment during the 
Missouri Compromise period, the political absence of such similarly motivated issues as 
womens rights and penal reform, and the pragmatic moralities of leading abolitionist 
politicians as evidence of the anti-slavery movements political origins.  Riker concludes 
that, slavery was always an evil but not always a political issue.  What made it a 
political issue was that, by reason of the structure of politics in the mid-1830s, it was to 
some peoples advantage to place abolition on the political agenda.59 
 In an ultimately successful effort to defeat the Democrats, the Whigs, themselves 
composed of both pro- and anti-slavery factions, began flooding Congress with anti-
slavery petitions. The Wilmot Proviso, an amendment prohibiting slavery in any territory 
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captured during the Mexican-American War that was introduced repeatedly from 1846 to 
1848, affected cross-partisan, North-verses-South voting and likely resulted in Condorcet 
cycling.  On August 8th, 1846, though conclusive evidence was not recorded, Riker finds 
it probable that the existence of two political dimensions, being pro- or anti-war and pro- 
or anti-slavery, resulted in cycling in the House of Representatives, as none of the three 
options before the Houseincreased war appropriations with the Proviso, increased war 
appropriations without the Proviso, and not increasing war appropriationswere able to 
defeat both of the other options in pair-wise comparisons.60  The particular method of 
selection used resulted in passage of the Proviso, though it later failed to pass in the 
Senate due to a filibuster.   
 The Wilmot Proviso is important to Riker because, as an anti-slavery initiative of 
Northern Democrats, it was introduced for the purpose of dividing the former majority 
into Northern and Southern factions, an objective it accomplished.  Also, the probable 
cycling in House of Representatives demonstrates the potential for multi-dimensional 
issues to cause cycling and result in arbitrary outcomes, in this case without manipulation.  
Though the Jacksonian-Jeffersonian majority was not finally split until 1860, the Proviso 
establishes slavery as an issue capable of supplanting the dominant agrarian-industrial 
political dimension.61 
  The 1860 Presidential election was contested by four major candidates: Stephan 
Douglas, the Northern Democratic candidate (the Democratic Party having split over 
slavery policy at the nomination convention); John Breckinridge, the Southern 
Democratic candidate; John Bell of the Constitutional Union Party, founded by former 
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Whigs and others who opposed the Democrats in the Southern States; and Abraham 
Lincoln of the Republican Party, founded in 1854 by a group of Whigs, Northern 
Democrats, and Free Soilers.62  Though the former majority was split, Lincolns victory 
did not result from the formation of a new majority; he and the Republicans won by 
sweeping the heavily populated Northern States while ignoring the rest of the Country. 
 Lincolns election was the culmination of an effort to divide the agrarians and 
create conditions in which industrialist victories would be possible.  However, the 
industrialists were unable to form a majority, only being able to create a polarized multi-
dimensional political environment in which the absence of a Condorcet winner 
necessitated the election of a candidate disapproved of by most electors, whose pro-
industrialisation position was, as likely was his war-instigating stance on slavery, a 
Condorcet loser.63 
Riker maintains that this example confirms his understanding of democratic 
government.  The slavery issue was introduced, in 1819 and also later, not in response to 
popular demand, but as tool by which the minority leadership hoped to divide the 
majority.  The majority agrarians were divided by the issue of slavery and, though there 
remained a large majority in favour of pro-agrarian government, an industrialist was 
elected; furthermore, his victory was wholly dependent upon the method of vote 
tabulation.  Given such an understanding of democratic government, Riker concludes 
that the outcomes of voting are not necessarily fair and true amalgamations of voters 
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values, that these outcomes may be meaningless, and that the majorities that make 
outcomes are themselves in flux.64 
Having completed his inquiry into the ability of democratic meansvoting as a 
method of social choiceto meet democratic endsthe liberal and populist conceptions 
of democracyRiker continues to expand upon the implications of his conclusion.  He 
notes that although the two understandings of democracy are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, they are created by the construction of conflicting institutions; liberal 
governments have institutions which divide and otherwise restrain power, where populist 
governments are designed to facilitate timely, uncompromised, and uninhibited 
government action.65   
For this reason, Riker finds that liberal democracy, which does not theoretically 
prohibit attempts of populist governance, practically precludes such efforts because the 
institutions required in both instances are mutually exclusive.  Also, Riker contends that 
populism is disposed towards the unfettered concentration of power, and, therefore, is 
dangerously susceptible to tyranny and succumbing to undemocratic government.66  
Given its observed volatility and absurdity, Riker concludes that democracy must be 
preserved by avoiding populism and populist tendencies, and that institutions that 
mitigate this risk are vital to the survival of liberal democracy.67   
As the concentration of power can erode individual liberties, Riker thinks that 
power must be divided in order to protect these liberties and ensure the survival of 
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67 Riker, Liberalism, p. 250. 
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democracy.68  To these ends, he recommends institutions such as a multicameral 
legislature; a division of legislative, executive, and judiciary authority; a division of 
authority between national and regional governments; and term limits for elected 
officials.69  These recommendations result directly from Rikers acceptance of Berlins 
analysis of liberty; positive liberty, according to Riker and Berlin, is a cause of tyranny, 
where negative liberty is truly valuable.  Accordingly, Riker concludes that liberty must 
be preserved by inhibiting the powers of government.  Riker doubts that liberal 
democracy can exist independent of liberal constitutional limitations, instead foreseeing 
an inevitable transition to populism and eventually tyranny in their absence.70 
 
The minimalist conclusion of William Rikers intricate and original conception of 
democracy is founded upon the unreliability and malleability of democratic outcomes.  
For outcomes to be valuable, as per the positive understanding of liberty, they must be 
accurate [meaning fair and rational] amalgamations of voters values.71  With reference 
to Arrows Theorem, Riker demonstrates that no electoral method can guarantee both the 
fair and the rational aggregation of voters individual preferences.  Then, drawing upon 
historical examples, he shows how the manipulation of political processes can create and 
exploit situations in which there is not a rational and fair outcome.  Accordingly, Riker 
concludes that, as they are not consistently accurate and it is rarely possible to determine 
if one is in fact accurate, substantive outcomes cannot be considered intrinsically 
valuable. 
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Deliberative democratic theories, which, in refutation of social choice, contend 
that rational political discourse can result in rational, meaningful, and therefore valuable 
substantive democratic outcomes, 72 subject the conceptions of Riker and Schumpeter to 
the same criticism, revealing several commonalities.  Deliberative theorists, such as John 
Dryzek, argue that discussion and debate encourage single-dimension political decisions, 
in which Condorcet cycling is not possible,73 in addition to promoting awareness and 
curbing strategic actions or manipulation.74  In response, its detractors argue that 
deliberation can only ensure that people agree on the dimensions of their differences,75 
and that deliberative manipulation can lead people to hold beliefs that are not in their 
best interest.76  Though deliberative theorys validity is highly disputed and unlikely to 
be verified, that deliberative conceptions of democracy conflict with those of Schumpeter 
and Riker is obvious. 
The conclusions of Riker and Schumpeter differ primarily because Schumpeter 
assumes77 that any normative justification of democracy must depend on substantive 
democratic outcomes, while Riker finds an alternative justification.  The two theorists 
definitions of democracyunderstandings of the conditions that taxonomically 
distinguish democracy from other forms of governmentexplain this difference.  Riker 
does not offer an easily quotable, single sentence definition, but examines the three 
universal elements he observes in existing democratic governmentsparticipation, 
liberty, and equalityand from them discerns a definition.  These characteristics are both 
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the means and ends of the democratic ideal, and are all necessary conditions of 
significant political competition.78  
For elections to be genuinely competitive there must be individual liberties 
sufficient to free dissidents from fears of oppression, political and legal equality, and 
universal rights to participation in the political process.  For Riker, voting is a necessary, 
but not sufficient, condition of democracy [Democratic] voting must be surrounded 
with numerous institutions like political parties and free speech [and political equality 
and individual libertiesext.] which organize voting into a genuine choice.79  As 
summarised from the preceding analysis, Riker defines democracy as a system of 
government in which rulers are selected by free, equal, and universally open competitive 
elections. 
When compared with Schumpeters definition, which is substantively the same 
save omitting the free, equal, and universally open caveat place on electoral 
competition, Rikers definition exposes the cause of Schumpeters value-neutral 
assessment of democracy.  Schumpeter maintains that it is possible for a country to be 
both democratic and practice the persecution of Christians, the persecution of witches, 
and the slaughtering of Jews.80  Based on this understanding, he concludes that 
democracy is only a political method and must produce independently desirable 
conditions to be of value.81  Similarly, Schumpeter states that the relation between 
democracy and freedom is not absolutely stringent and can be tampered with.82 
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It is clear that democracy, as defined by Riker, can not coexist with minority 
persecutions; a terrorised minority can not freely and equally participate in competitive 
elections, and therefore any government, elected or otherwise, that persecutes a minority 
is not considered democratic.  Schumpeter, concluding that democratic competition will 
in most cases though not in all mean a considerable amount of freedom of discussion for 
all,83 allows governments that disenfranchise portions of their population still to satisfy 
his definition of democracy.  As compared with Rikers definition, it is this provision 
alone that leads Schumpeter to conclude that democracy has no intrinsic value.  
Conversely, Rikers definition, including free and fair elections and universal 
enfranchisement as necessary conditions, ensures that democratic government is 
normatively valuable.   
Rikers and Schumpeters normative assessments of substantive democratic 
outcomes are unified by an acceptance of manipulation as a political fact of life; the 
manipulation of the decision-making process is central to Rikers theory, while 
Schumpeter, to a lesser extent, accounts for the deception of the voting public.  Both 
theorists are ultimately concerned with democracys inability to reflect voters interests
Schumpeters wills and Rikers valuesin its outcomes.  And so, the corruption of 
individual expressions of interest, either in the mind of the individual or in the process of 
preference aggregation, is an essential element of both conceptions. 
In this respect, both theories also acknowledge the electorates political apathy.  
As illustrated by Rikers reference to Pliny the Younger, in which Plinys attempt to 
manipulate a vote is thwarted by the strategic voting of opponents who are conscious of 
his intentions, manipulation becomes more difficult as the electorates involvement and 
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knowledge increases.  Yet, Riker thinks that manipulation can be easily accomplished 
because citizens rarely have access to perfect information.84  Schumpeter, who finds 
outcomes only circumstantially valuable primarily because electors opinions are not 
reliably consistent with their interests, supports his conclusion by arguing that a high 
degree of political apathy is an inevitable feature of society.  This position is evidently a 
product of Schumpeters focus on existing democratic governments, a focus also 
observable in Rikers work. 
Ultimately, despite their differences, it becomes apparent that Schumpeters and 
Rikers normative judgements of democratic outcomes are complementary.  
Schumpeters argumentthat individuals do not vote in their own best interestsand 
Rikers argumentthat votes cannot be aggregated rationally and fairlyresult in the 
same conclusionthat electoral results are not consistent with the values or wills of 
the people85and are more compelling in unison than either is in isolation.  Although 
their theories address different aspects of the outcome formation process, both 
Schumpeter and Riker are united by the conclusion that the interests of voters can be and 
are consistently corrupted during democratic decision making.  This conclusion leads 
both theorists to find that substantive democratic outcomes cannot reliably justify the 
democratic form of government, cementing their minimalist credentials. 
                                                
84 Riker, Liberalism, p. 179. 
85 Riker, Liberalism, p. 236; Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 253. 
 58
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four: 
Russell Hardin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 59
In Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy and Indeterminacy and Society, 
Russell Hardin treats several topics that are addressed by minimalist theories.  In the 
former work, he attempts to explain political order in existing constitutional democracies, 
where in the latter he examines indeterminacy and its impact on normative and 
explanatory theories of social interaction.  Both of these works impact on the normative 
value of democratic outcomes and therefore are relevant to minimalist democratic theory.   
Through examination of his theories, it will be possible to determine whether or not 
Hardin is, in fact, a minimalist, and assess his contributions, if any, to minimalist 
democratic theory. 
 
In Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, Hardin argues that liberalism, 
constitutionalism, and democracy are sociological coordination theories when they work 
to establish and maintain social order,1 meaning that they function practically and 
structure politics because they coordinate the interests of powerful social groups.  Hardin 
offers this coordination theory, as he terms it, as an explanation of political order.2  
Government structures and institutions are established to serve and mediate the interests 
of powerful groups.  In this work, Hardin seeks to demonstrate that such an 
understanding of political reality can explain the development and survival of democratic 
government. 
Hardin states that liberalism is about arranging institutions to allow us to prosper 
in our own individual ways,3 or to pursue individual interests.  Constitutions work when 
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 60
and only when they benefit a sufficient quantity of significant interests.  Finally, 
democracy can be practiced if important, potentially divisive issues such as basic 
political and economic order, have been previously, usually constitutionally, coordinated 
and decided.4 
 Hardins thesis is explanatory, concerning sociological mutual advantage and is 
not a normative claim that liberalism, constitutionalism, or democracy genuinely serves 
the full mutual interest (that is, the advantage of everyone).5  Institutions and concepts 
based on interest coordination are not necessarily good or bad, as, for example, 
governments that infringe on the liberties of weak groups may still satisfy enough 
powerful interests to retain power, and coordinations often leave out important but 
politically ineffective groups.6  Once established, interest coordinating institutions 
survive when their acceptance is in the interests of most and the cost of establishing 
different institutions is sufficient to deter those for whom dissent might otherwise be 
rational.7 
 Hardin thinks that coordination is the central mode of social order in complex 
modern societ[ies].8  In doing so, he disagrees with conflict theorists, like Karl Marx and 
Ralf Dahrendorf who maintain that coercive class conflict structures society; shared-
value theorists, like Emile Durkheim and John Locke, who find that mutual commitment 
to some type of abstract social contract can explain social organization; and exchange 
theorists, like Adam Smith and Bernard Mandeville, who think that rational individual 
interest maximization orders society.  Coordination theory, which as it concerns interests 
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is an extension of conflict theory, concludes that the satisfaction of influential interests is 
the primary force structuring society.9  Hardin does not pursue an exhaustive argument in 
favour of coordination structuring society, but, insofar as it applies to liberal 
constitutional democracies, presents an interest coordination theory of political order that 
explains the creation and survival of democratic governments. 
 Hardin conceives of democracy as occurring in two distinct stagesthe 
democratic creation of a constitution and the democratic decision-making that occurs 
under that constitution.10  The crafting of a constitution, according to Hardin, is purely a 
matter of interest coordination.  Genuine coordination occurs between parties with 
competing but not directly opposing interests, the integration of which will benefit all 
parties, but potentially some more than others;11 for example, although they would 
remain in competition, each of the Thirteen Colonies benefited from the liberalization of 
interstate-trade provided by the U. S. constitution.12  The relationship between these 
interests is constitutionally defined by institutional structures; for example, when 
deciding upon general political order, institutions, such as a court system and declaration 
of rights, are typically created to define and protect individual liberties.13  A constitution 
is established through the successful coordination of powerful interests and maintained 
by evolving conventions that ensure continued coordination.14 
 Once a constitution is established, the democratic conduct of elections and the 
decision-making of representative bodies cannot be examined independently of the 
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constitution.  In this context, democracy works only on the margins of great issues, 
those decided by the constitution.15  As Hardin states: 
The few big issues democracy can handle are those on which there is broad 
consensussuch as the consensuses in the United Kingdom and the United States 
on fighting World War II. For conflictive issues democracy can work only 
against a background of rough coordination on order.  Without that essentially 
prior coordination, democracy is trammeled or irrelevant.  And even with the 
relevant coordination on order, if precise theoretical claims are at issue, 
democracy works only in the sense that it reaches a resultbut not in the sense 
that it gets the right result. 
If political divisions cut very much deeper than the marginal issues on which we 
can democratically compromise, democracy may no longer seem to produce 
mutual benefits.  It then produces majornot marginalwinners and losers. Big 
disagreements bring [democracy] down.  For example, democracy could not 
handle the conflict over slavery in the United States or the conflict over Algeria in 
France, and it could not even get off the ground in independent Burundi.16 
    
 Hardin then explains how other, coincidentally normative, explanations of 
democracy are incompatible with his understanding of constitutional government.  
Conceiving of democracy as a means to popular sovereignty is both normatively and 
descriptively incorrect: 
Popular control fails in principle for two quite different reasons.  First, there are 
the standard problems of social choice, that popular views will commonly not 
aggregate into a collective view and that individuals will be motivated neither to 
understand public issues well enough to act on them nor take action even when 
they do understand them.  Secondly, there is the nature of institutional 
government.  To be effective, government must work through institutions.  But 
the structure and eventually the actions of institutions are substantially unintended 
consequences, the result of growth and not the outcome of popular choice or even 
any systematic choice at all.17  
 
Constitutional institutions are created expressly to limit the domain of majority 
decision-making.  Court systems and constitutional rights remove issues of justice from 
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the democratic realm, protecting widespread interests in individual liberties, for 
example.18  The decisions of one generation leave its successors with a set of enabling 
and constraining institutions that cannot be easily altered.19  These institutions change 
over time, but, due to what might be termed the paradox of sovereigntya sovereign 
body must be able to bind its future actions but can not be sovereign if bound by its past 
actionsinstitutions develop over time in ways that cannot be fully controlled by 
anyone, let alone the polity acting as such, and so produce outcomes that are not entirely 
intended.20  Even when control is exerted, Hardin states that change is often intra-
institutional and evolutionary, opportunistic and conflict ridden rather than 
democratic, citing the massive American economic changes after the Civil War and 
World War II that distanced business interests from the popular arena.21 Such institutions 
are democratic only in the most indirect sense that democratically elected officials have 
had a hand in their growth.22   
This explanation of democratic institutions corroborates the minimalist position.  
If democratic decisions are made on the periphery of important issues and government 
actions are heavily influenced by the institutional structure of government, the electorate 
probably cannot direct the actions of government in a way that, as Dahl and Rikers 
positive liberty maintain, will allow them to live under laws of their own creation.  It is 
also unlikely that, through democratic participation, the people will be able to maximize 
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their interests.  Therefore, substantive democratic outcomes cannot be valued for 
producing such results.  
Hardin also maintains that Anthony Downss theory of the irrationality of voting 
indicates limits to the responsibility of democratic citizens and precludes conceiving of 
democracy as a consensual association of individuals.23  Downs, in An Economic Theory 
of Democracy, demonstrates that the influence of an individual ballot does not justify the 
effort of voting.24  In explicit support of Schumpeters opinion of the individuals 
political capacity, Hardin expands upon Downs theory, stating that the crux of citizen 
responsibility in a democracy is the causal efficacy of the role of the citizen and the 
individuals justification for acquiring relevant knowledge.  If the role is entirely 
inefficacious, there is no social reason to acquire knowledge and the citizen might 
rationally remain ignorant.25  Furthermore, he suggests that increasing the knowledge of 
the electorate may raise general awareness of conflicting interests and have the 
perverse effect of destabilizing democratic government.26  This statement is not as 
perverse as Hardin thinks, as, in order for the acquisition of such knowledge to be 
rational, the decisions being made must be of immense importance, concerning issues 
that could precipitate constitutional collapse. 
Hardin, however, has a more practical reason for finding a knowledgeable 
population undesirable: the overall cost of each citizens knowledge would impact greatly 
upon the standard of living enjoyed in modern democracies:   
The condition of rational ignorance is not blameworthy or somehow immoral or 
irresponsible.  It is a natural implication of the division of labour that makes life 
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richer for all of us. It follows not only that we can at best make limited claims 
for the responsibility of citizens to participate in democratic government, but also 
that democracy cannot be justified by appeal to its grounding in substantial citizen 
participation. 27 
 
By rationalizing Schumpeters opinion of the general publics political capacity, 
Hardin supports Schumpeters understanding of democracy and its minimalist 
conclusions.  If it is irrational for individuals to be informed of their own interests, the 
product of their opinionsdemocratic outcomescan be intrinsically valuable.  For this 
reason, Hardin finds that conceptions of democracy founded on the value, or rightness, of 
the decisions made are not reasonably applicable to modern democracies.   
The citizenrys rational ignorance precludes claims that democracy contributes to 
the development of individual autonomy, which incidentally is far better served by un-
democratically secured rights to prosperity and physical security.28  Similarly, the 
contractarian assertion that democratic decisions constitute agreements of value is 
unfounded.29  Finally, any notion of sovereign popular direction of government is 
unrealistic.  One might argue for an ideal conception of democracy, in which all or most 
citizens knowledgeably participate.  But that ideal cannot be used to justify or practically 
criticize the results of an actual democracy in which participation is heavily subject to the 
accidental whims of individual interests.30   
As Hardin paraphrases from Tocquevilles Democracy in America, it is not what 
democracy does for us but what happens under it through private agency that is the 
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beauty of democracy.31  He concludes that, although liberal constitutional democracy 
cannot guarantee the existence of a good society, and therefore is not necessarily valuable 
in and of itself, it is arguably necessary to the structure of a good society. 32  The 
mutual advantage, or coordination, theory of democratic government can account for 
institutions that guarantee reasonably high standards of procedural justice, individual 
liberty, and economic prosperity, but only in societies in which interests are already 
highly coordinated.33  Ultimately, in any real society, mutual advantage can at best 
explain what happens. [It] cannot morally justify the results without some strong 
additional consideration.34  Democracy may be justifiable, but it cannot be justified by 
coordination theory, as it is an explanatory, not normative, theory. 
 
The theories advanced in Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy support 
several minimalist positions.  Although Hardin does not draw normative conclusions, he 
dismisses the same basic normative explanations of democracy refuted by William Riker 
and Joseph Schumpeter.  Each theorist, using various methods in works spanning sixty 
years, rejects the idea that democratic elections allow the popular direction of 
government in a way that can be considered valuable.  In doing so, a number of common 
themes emerge in their works. 
The existence of fundamental social divisions of interests and values are central to 
the theories of Hardin and Schumpeter.  Both agree that such divisions preclude the 
existence of a single goal or good to which all citizens could agree and aspire, and that 
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could justify democracy.35  Hardin, unlike Schumpeter who briefly asserts the existence 
of fundamental divisions, presents examples of divisions and expands upon their greater 
impact on the practice of democratic government. 
Hardin gives several examples of divisions that have toppled democratic 
governments, citing recent examples of democratic failure in Rwanda, Burundi, and the 
former Yugoslavia.36  Interestingly, he also invokes two examples from American 
history, the Civil War and the Great Depression.  In both of these periods, significant 
numbers of the population seemed to think the divisive issue was the most important 
issue of the day, so important as to be worth wrecking the government to get the right 
outcome.37  The outbreak of World War II ended the depression and prevented a 
decisive conflict; the conflict over slavery, however, caused the momentary collapse of 
democratic government in the United States. 
Like Riker, Hardin understands the Civil War as a conflict between the opposing 
interests of the slave owning agrarians and the Northern industrialists.38  While Riker 
only seeks to expose the manipulation of Lincolns election and the success of a minority 
position, Hardin explains the Civil War as arising from a conflict of major interests that 
could no longer be coordinated.39  Slavery was an issue on which the South was not 
prepared to compromise and, as noted by Riker, its profitability had become a threat to 
free labour and the North economy.40  As the original compromise and coordination of 
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Confederation was broken, neither the American Constitution nor democracy could 
decide or mediate the issue.41 
In this example, Hardins coordination theory supports Rikers conclusions, 
insofar as manipulation is encouraged by major divisions.  With the economic prosperity 
of both parties in question, both sides could be expected to pursue whatever methods 
might lead to victory, including elaborate manipulations of the democratic process and, in 
this case, war.  Also, the resulting victory of the numerical minority, as observed by 
Riker,42 confirms Hardins claim that powerful interests, as opposed to the opinion of the 
majority, determine the outcomes of issues they deem important. 
As they create situations in which democratic governance is impossible, 
competing major interests necessitate restricting democratic decisions to relatively 
unimportant issues.  Democracy can only function, according to Hardin, on the margins 
of major issues that have been coordinated into mutually advantageous compromises.43  
The impossibility of democratic decision-making beyond the realm of marginal issues 
suggests that, in accordance with Schumpeter, irreconcilable divisions also prevent 
agreement within that realm.  Schumpeter theorizes that social divisions impede 
democratic decisions, making it impossible for democratic outcomes to be in the interests 
of all citizens, or commonly good.44  Hardin, because he argues that the forces exerted by 
divergent interests determine the structure of democratic governments, supports 
Schumpeters minimalist conclusions, although he does not draw any normative 
conclusions himself. 
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In addition to expanding upon the existence and implications of divisive interests, 
Hardin also presents a revised version of Schumpeters understanding of the general 
populations political competence.  As Downs concludes that voting is irrational, Hardin 
finds that acquiring the knowledge required to make meaningful political judgments is 
also irrational.45  By doing so, Hardin provides Schumpeters position, ultimately an 
assumption about human nature based on his observations, with a logical grounding.  
While Hardin develops this theory in refutation of explanations contradictory to his 
coordination theory of political order, it greatly strengthens the normative conclusions of 
Schumpeter. 
Lastly, Schumpeter, Riker, and Hardin agree that certain institutions and practices 
are necessary parts of any democratic government.   Schumpeter and Riker, who derive 
their conclusions from the theoretical examination democracys normative value, albeit 
with a definite focus on reality, reach their findings in a different manner than Hardin, 
who endeavours to explain the realistic practice of constitutional democracy and 
identifies elements essential to its success.  Despite their various approaches, each 
theorist concludes that restricting the legislative powers of government is essential to 
democracys survival. 
That important interests must be constitutionally coordinated and beyond the 
influence of electoral democracy is the central theme of Hardins work.  As previously 
noted, he argues that exposing those interests to democratic decisions would eventually 
compromise those interests and lead the disaffected groups to rebel against, succeed 
from, or otherwise terminate democratic government.  And accordingly, he maintains that 
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the existence of a constitution that restricts democratic government and ensures that 
potentially divisive conflicts do not arise is a requisite of democracy.46  
Joseph Schumpeter, among other findings, states that for government decision to 
be at all coherent or fair, the effective range of political decisions must be limited 
depending upon the characteristics of the society in which it is practiced; although, unlike 
Hardin, he thinks that legislative bodies must exercise self-restraint.47  Remarkably, 
Schumpeter seems to understand instinctively the realities of political order Hardin 
formalizes fifty-seven years later, stating that: 
 Democratic government will work to full advantage only if all the interests that 
matter are practically unanimous not only in their allegiance to the country but 
also in their allegiance to the structural principles of the existing society.  
Whenever these principles are called into question and issues arise that rend a 
nation into two hostile camps, democracy works at a disadvantage.  And it may 
cease to work at all as soon as interests and ideals are involved on which people 
refuse to compromise.48 
 
William Riker thinks that, because democratic decisions are arbitrary and subject 
to manipulation, and, like Hardin, that they must be constrained by a liberal 
constitution.49  He identifies institutionsmulti-cameral legislatures, independent 
judiciaries, divided executive and legislative powers, and term limitsthat have been 
vital to the survival of American democracy.50  Without such institutions, democracy 
would be vulnerable to the concentration of power, the erosion of democracy, and, 
eventually, tyrannical government.51 
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In Indeterminacy and Society, Russell Hardin examines indeterminacy that arises 
from strategic interaction.  Indeterminacy is best described as the absence of a definite 
rational course of actionwhen there is not a clear rational action in a situation, that 
situation is indeterminate.  Indeterminacy can apply to both collective and individual 
decisions; Kenneth Arrow, in Social Choice and Individual Values, discovered 
indeterminacy when he concluded that the aggregation of individual interests may yield 
no clear, determinate, collective interest.52  In the context of individual choice, 
indeterminacy exists because choices are made in a social context, where the outcomes 
depend on the strategic actions of multiple individuals.  Because the actions of others can 
not be foreseen, an individual can only select a strategy, based on the predicted actions of 
others, that may or may not produce the desired outcome;53 an individual may act 
rationally, but there is no certainty that the most rational of actions will produce the 
desired result.   
Indeterminacy impacts a variety of social theories, including those concerned with 
justifying government and its actions, which are substantially clarified by 
acknowledging their indeterminacy.54  As they require identifying a good, moral theories, 
including those justifying democracy, must overcome indeterminacy.55  Utilitarian 
theories attempt to render collective choices determinate by summing the benefits and 
detriments that choice may have for every individual.  These theories fail simply because 
it is impossible to compare personal judgments of utility, happiness, value, welfare, and 
                                                
52 Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd edition, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
[1951] 1963), p. 60. 
53 Russell Hardin, Indeterminacy and Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 1. 
54 Hardin, Indeterminacy, p. 14. 
55 Hardin, Indeterminacy, p. 99. 
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so on.56  The only plausible additive theoryCoases Theoremfunctions only when all 
factors involved have established monetary values, which can be summed.57 
The only method that overcomes indeterminacy, according to Hardin, is the 
holistic approach taken by Thomas Hobbes.  Hobbes justifies the creation of a 
government because it will result in an improvement for all individuals,58 as opposed to 
additive theories, in which individuals may gain or lose but the whole must benefit; a 
normative judgment that Vilfredo Pareto would reassert centuries later.59  Hardin 
concludes that only actions that result in improvement for allthat are mutually 
advantageouscan be deemed morally justified.60  This mutual advantage must be 
differentiated from the sociological mutual advantage discussed in Liberalism, 
Constitutionalism, and Democracy; in the former all interests are served where in the 
latter only powerful interests are satisfied.   
It is important to note that the morality of mutually advantageous actions does not 
render actions that do not serve the mutual advantage, which harm some, immoral.61  
Deposing a tyrant is not mutually advantageous, as the tyrant will be worse off, but, given 
                                                
56 Hardin, Indeterminacy, p. 59. 
57 Hardin, Indeterminacy, p. 79-80.  Coases theorem is explained on pages 70 to 74.  Coase states that, 
when there are several alternatives, the one that results in the creation of the most wealth is the best and that 
making decisions in this way is morally justified if those who prosper from a decision compensate those 
who suffer from the decision.  Of course, such a method can only judge decisions in which all inputs and 
outcomes can be valued monetarily. 
58 Hardin, Indeterminacy, p. 43. 
59 Hardin, Indeterminacy, p. 13. Although the basic principles of their normative judgments are identical, 
Hardin differentiates between Hobbes and Pareto.  Where Hobbes is concerned with very general or 
principled agreements, pertaining to a form of government for example, Pareto is concerned with policy 
decision by a governing body (43).  Hardin thinks that Pareto optimal alternatives may not be rational or 
determinate in a dynamic environment because the result of one Pareto optimalmutually advantageous
decision will influence the scope, or Pareto frontier, of the next Pareto optimal decision, potentially making 
the first decision not mutually advantageous (11).  Also, it is impossible to judge between multiple Pareto 
optimal alternatives.  As interpreted by Hardin, Hobbes justifies deciding between multiple alternatives 
when all individuals would prefer any of the alternatives to the status quo, but does not justify the selection 
of a specific alternative because some will benefit more than others (43).  For this reason, Hardin invokes 
the normative justifications of Hobbes over those of Pareto. 
60 Hardin, Indeterminacy, p. 7. 
61 Hardin, Indeterminacy, p. 52. 
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the benefit to the oppressed, it is definitely not wrong.  As Hardin does note, mutual 
advantage can only practically be used to justify the creation of a government (applied 
ex ante as Hardin states), as, once socio-political order is established, any change will 
result in winners and losers.62 
When most will benefit and the winners and losers cannot be predetermined, 
actions that result in some individuals being worse-off may be mutually advantageous, 
and therefore moral.63  Universal polio vaccination, for example, serves the mutual 
advantage because it greatly reduce every individuals risk of infection, although the 
small percentage that contracts polio from the vaccination, and may not have contracted it 
otherwise, will suffer.  Similarly, criminal justice systems, which discourage violent 
crimes, are mutually advantageous even though some may be wrongfully convicted, 
provided that no group is more likely than others to be wrongfully convicted.64 
Mutual advantage can be used to make only the most general decisions.  While 
the creation of a government can be justified and is a determinate choice, deciding upon a 
form of government will remain indeterminate, as some will benefit more than others.65  
Most general, and all specific, questions of collective action cannot be resolved by 
mutual advantage and remain indeterminate.  However, it can be mutually advantageous 
to set up institutions in advance to do things that could not individually be justified as 
serving mutual advantage.66   
                                                
62 Hardin, Indeterminacy, p. 118. 
63 Hardin, Indeterminacy, p. 44. 
64 Hardin, Indeterminacy, p. 48. 
65 Hardin, Indeterminacy, p. 43, 
66 Hardin, Indeterminacy, p. 52. 
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Mutual advantage is a relatively compelling holistic normative principle for 
social organizationwhen it applies.67  Unfortunately, as it is rarely applicable, most 
decisions must be made in its absence.  Hardin states that decisions are made, and society 
continues to function, despite a lack of normative guidance, through the creation of 
institutions that produce what Hardin terms mechanical determinacy.68  It may become 
necessary or pragmatically desirable to enact policies, such as conscription and various 
welfare programs, that necessitate interpersonal trade-offs.  Indeed, it seems 
inconceivable that a government that genuinely made society work relatively well could 
govern without making policies that fail the test of mutual advantage and that therefore 
reek of rational indeterminacy.69  As Hardin states, these institutions facilitate choice in 
the vast normative no-mans-land:   
We do not genuinely eliminate all of the relevant indeterminacies when we select, 
fall into, or adapt one organizational form rather than various others, but we do 
allow ourselves to improve on our status quo ante by simply, mechanically 
overriding some of the indeterminacies of strategic interaction.70 
 
  
 As he concludes that decisions derived from democratic outcomes cannot be 
morally justified, the theories presented in Indeterminacy and Society confirm Russell 
Hardin as a minimalist.  Because of instances of collective indeterminacy, Hardin, like 
                                                
67 Hardin, Indeterminacy, p. 121.  On page 51, Hardin states that insofar as they suppose that the standard 
of agreement for setting up a government or constitutional order ought to be far higher than the standards 
for adopting a policy under that government, His argument is partially analogous to that of Buchannan 
and Tullock.  However, unlike Buchanan [and Tullock, Hardin] is not making a normative argument about 
how we should do things.  Rather [he] merely note[s] that we might readily agree on an institutional 
structure in advance as though from a principle of insufficient reason.    
In this quote, Hardin is primarily referring to James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock in The Calculus of 
Consent, Volume 2 of the collected works of Gordon Tullock, (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Inc., [1962] 
2004), Chapter 6. 
68 Hardin, Indeterminacy, p. 121. 
69 Hardin, Indeterminacy, p. 52. 
70 Hardin, Indeterminacy, p. 127. 
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Riker, asserts that the normative value of democratic outcomes cannot be determined; 
unlike Riker, he attributes his finding to the impossibility of aggregating individual 
interests, as opposed to individual opinions.  In his earlier work, Hardin refutes 
justifications of democracy that rely on the value of democratic decisions; the value, in 
this case, being found in mutual agreement and being refuted by the rationality of 
political ignorance.71  In the latter work, Hardin finds that decisions occurring at a sub-
institutional level, as democratic decisions are understood in his earlier work, must 
concern issues that cannot be normatively determined.72  Democratic outcomes, 
therefore, are neither good nor bad, and cannot be normatively justified.   
 Riker, like Hardin, finds that collective indeterminacy renders democratic 
outcomes normatively neutral.  However, where Riker is concerned only with the 
electoral aggregation of individual expressions, Hardin is concerned with the aggregation 
of individual interests.  This is because Riker is specifically concerned with contradicting 
theories that value the popular direction of government, while Hardin is concerned with 
contemporary ordinal utilitarian theories.   
Hardin, prior to examining the implications of indeterminacy, finds, by 
synthesizing the works of Downs and Schumpeter, that notions of popular direction of 
government are incompatible with the electorates rational ignorance;73 instead, he 
addresses the idea that democratic decisions can be justified because they serve the 
interests of a majority of individuals.  The indeterminacy-focused theories of Riker and 
Hardin are complementary, differing only because they are developed in refutation of 
different theories.  As he examines a further way in which collective indeterminacy 
                                                
71 Hardin, Liberalism , p. 172. 
72 Hardin, Indeterminacy, p. 51. 
73 Hardin, Liberalism , p. 167. 
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affects the value of democratic outcomes, Hardin contributes to and strengthens the 
minimalist arguments examined in earlier chapters. 
 Unlike outcomes, democratic institutions are normatively justifiable, according to 
Hardin, because they serve the mutual advantage.  Hardin considers systems of criminal 
and common law mutually advantageous, and endorses Hobbes justification of the 
creation of a state.74 Hardin would, therefore, find democracy mutually advantageous and 
brutal authoritarian regimes, in which most people would be better off without a 
government, not mutually advantageous.  Hardins normative evaluation of the 
democratic form of government is somewhat similar to Rikers, who finds intrinsic value 
in the existence of political competition,75 as he finds the existence of democracy morally 
justifiable and democratic outcomes unjustifiable.  Although, as Hardins criterion of 
judgment is unable to discriminate between benevolent dictatorship and democracy, he 
may find other forms of government justifiable. 
  
 As he finds substantive democratic outcomes normatively unjustifiable, Russell 
Hardin is a minimalist theorist.  In both of the works examined, he develops theories that 
strengthen the minimalist conception of democracy, providing unique theories that 
corroborate and advance the theories of Schumpeter and Riker specifically, and 
minimalist democratic theory in general.  The theories presented in Indeterminacy and 
Society reveal that Hardin can be classified as a minimalist, while his original 
contributions to minimalist theory are found amongst the concepts forwarded in 
Liberalism Constitutionalism and Democracy. 
                                                
74 Hardin, Indeterminacy, p. 47. 
75 Riker, Liberalism, p. 8. 
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 In his later work, Hardin reviews and endorses the normative theories of Hobbes.  
Hardin finds that indeterminacy, as it arises from Arrows theorem, prevents normative 
judgments that rely on inter-personal comparisons, and, accordingly, that the only way a 
course of action can be judged moral is if all parties involved benefit.76  And furthermore, 
that such a justification can only be applied generally to changes from one condition to 
another, and not to the specifics of that change.77  Although he expands this normative 
judgment and develops a nuanced application, it was originally developed by Hobbes and 
expanded by Pareto and others.  Also, the normative impact of collective indeterminacy 
on democratic decisions has been noted by Arrow, Riker, and others.  In Indeterminacy 
and Society, Hardin ties collective indeterminacy to Hobbes normative justification and 
examines indeterminacys impact on various other theories of social interaction; as part 
of his larger work, he endorses minimalist conclusions that have principally been reached 
by others. 
 In Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, Hardin offers a value-neutral 
explanation of political order.  In doing so, he makes two unique contributions to 
minimalist theory: he provides a rational explanation of Schumpeters understanding of 
the general publics political competence, and forwards an understanding of political 
order that supports minimalist normative conclusions, grounding their theoretical findings 
in reality. 
 Hardins first contribution is, relative to the second, fairly simple.  He concludes 
that, as Downs demonstrates that casting a ballot is irrational, being politically informed 
                                                
76 Hardin, Indeterminacy, p. 43. 
77 Hardin, Indeterminacy, p. 43. 
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enough to form what Schumpeter terms genuine political wills is also irrational.78  This 
conclusion is a synthesis of two other theories, but is itself unique, and greatly improves 
Schumpeters conception of democracy.  Schumpeter, who essentially concludes that 
democratic outcomes cannot justify democracy because they are produced by individuals 
who cannot competently assess and act on their own interests, states that individual 
political competence cannot be improved but does theoretically and categorically refute 
such a possibility.  Hardin argues that if individuals rationally maximize their interests, as 
they must if substantive outcomes are to be valued for reaching a social welfare maxim,79  
then the negligible influence of a single individual does not justify the cost of being 
politically competent; an individuals interests are better served pursuing other 
objectives.80  Thereby, Hardin improves Schumpeters theory and its minimalist 
conclusion. 
 Hardins principle contribution to minimalist democratic theory is his 
understanding of political order.  Drawing upon compelling examples from American and 
European history, Hardin theorizes that politics is orderedgovernments and institutions 
are created, designed, and destroyedby the interest maximizing actions of powerful 
groups.81  Similarly, democratic constitutions are developed to coordinate these interests, 
which, if democracy is to survive, may not be impeded by democratic decisions.82 
 If Hardins understanding of political order is correct, it is not possible for 
substantive democratic outcomes to be valuable because they secure and maximize the 
                                                
78 Hardin, Liberalism , p. 166. 
79 There are other potential reasons for finding value in outcomes, such as the positive liberty refuted by 
Riker, but interest maximization is Schumpeters sole concern. 
80 Hardin, Liberalism , p. 166. 
81 Hardin, Liberalism , p. 12. 
82 Hardin, Liberalism , p. 140. 
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electorates interests or because they allow the electorate to be free or develop moral 
autonomy by living under laws of its own creation.  The survival of democracy, or any 
other type of government, depends on issues of paramount importance being decided and 
cemented to ensure the coordination of interests of sufficient power to destroy the 
government.83  With these issues removed from democratic control, substantive outcomes 
can, at best, be valued for allowing the popular decision of relatively unimportant issues, 
and, as the issues beyond popular influence are far more important, such value would 
likely, although Hardin does not comment conclusively, be an insufficient normative 
justification of democracy.  Furthermore, as allowing for the popular decision of 
important issues leads to democratic collapse,84 it is not possible to make substantive 
democratic outcomes valuable by allowing for the popular decision of such issues.   
 Hardins understanding of political order, as it refutes explanations of democratic 
government that find consistent normative value in democratic outcomes, is a minimalist 
theory.  Hardins explanation of political order, which is also potentially an explanation 
of social order, is founded on the tendency of powerful groups to act to protect and 
maximize their interests.  Drawing minimalist conclusions from this fact provides a 
unique minimalist argument, one that is independent from the theories of Schumpeter and 
Riker, neither of whom discuss the forces that order politics.   
                                                
83 Hardin, Liberalism , p. 140. 
84 Hardin, Liberalism , p. 280. 
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Minimalist theories maintain that the normative value of substantive democratic 
outcomesones that prescribe specific policies or actionsis insufficient to justify 
normatively the democratic form of governmentfind it morally superior to other forms 
of government.  All of the minimalist theorists herein examinedSchumpeter, Riker, and 
Hardinare united by their normative assessments of democratic outcomes, although 
their theoretical approaches are entirely unique: Schumpeter concludes that individuals 
cannot form opinions consistent with their own interests, and, therefore, that collective 
decisions cannot serve the collective interest;1 Riker finds that decisions made by 
preference aggregation are consistently irrational and, as such, cannot normatively justify 
democracy.2   
Hardin presents two separate minimalist positions, and, as the value of democratic 
outcomes is not central to either of his works, his minimalist stance requires some 
interpretation.  He theorizes that, as interpersonal utility comparisons are impossible, it is 
only possible to justify a change in the status quo morally when everyone will benefit 
from any form the change may take, but the morality of deciding on the particular form 
of that change or of any action in which all will not benefit cannot be determined;3 
therefore, one may conclude that democracy may be found superior to other forms of 
government, but any specific government policy cannot be judged moral or immoral.  
Hardin also thinks that the interest maximization of powerful groups can explain political 
order, including the structure of democratic governments.4  As Hardin finds that the 
                                                
1 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, [1942] 1962), p.  
250-268. 
2 William Riker, Liberalism against Populism (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, [1982] 1988), p. 
238-241. 
3Russell Hardin, Indeterminacy and Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 41-54. 
4Russell Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1999), 
p. 12-18. 
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survival of a government depends on the issues important to these groups being removed 
from popular control,5  one may conclude that any value found in democratic outcomes 
will be less significant to a moral justification of democracy than the value of the 
undemocratic coordination of powerful interests.  Hardin also addresses the value of such 
democratic decisions and, through his Downsian rationalization of Schumpeters 
understanding of the general publics political competence, concludes that substantive 
democratic outcomes are not intrinsically, normatively valuable.6  
Each theorist has a different opinion of democracys normative value.  
Schumpeter thinks that democracy cannot be valued independently of its outcomes and, 
as he finds that all democratic outcomes can be normatively good or bad, he concludes 
that any given democratic government may be a morally superior or inferior form of 
government, depending on the morality of its outcomes.7  Alternatively, Riker concludes 
that genuine political competition, which is a requisite of democracy, guarantees certain 
individual liberties and provides the electoral opportunity to remove tyrants, which 
causes democracy to be a normatively justifiable, morally superior, form of government.8  
Hardin, though his position is inconclusive, reaches a conclusion similar to Schumpeter.  
As he theorizes that only a change in which all people benefit may be judged moral,9 
Hardin finds democracy superior to a Hobbesian state of nature, but concludes that, in all 
other circumstances, it is impossible to judge democracy normatively. 
 Although their normative judgments of democracy and the foci of their theories 
differ, these three theorists are united by their minimalist conclusions.  No aspect of 
                                                
5 Hardin, Liberalism , p. 280-5. 
6 Hardin, Liberalism , p. 165-74. 
7 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 242. 
8 Riker, Liberalism, p. 241-246. 
9 Hardin, Indeterminacy, p. 41-54. 
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Schumpeters assessment of social divisions and individual political competence, Rikers 
examination of collective preference aggregation, and Hardins understanding of political 
order or collective indeterminacy is contradictory.  And, despite their peripheral 
differences, the minimalist arguments of each theory do not conflict, and, in fact, are 
complementary.   
 Schumpeters argument that most individuals lack the ability to develop genuine 
political wills is supported by Hardins assertion that democratic decisions must be 
restricted to relatively unimportant issues and that, therefore, the costs of being politically 
competent exceed the benefits.  Also, Rikers finding that individual preferences cannot 
be consistently aggregated into rational and fair collective decisions provides a further 
reason why democracy, as Schumpeter attests, cannot produce outcomes that reflect a 
common good.  Similarly, Hardins understanding of political order, in which the 
jurisdiction of democratic decisions must be restricted if democracy is to survive,10 is 
supported by Schumpeter and Riker, both of whom conclude that, because substantive 
democratic outcomes are not necessarily reflective of the electorates interests or 
opinions, the democratic direction of government must be restricted.11 
 Additionally, Rikers normative social choice theory is reinforced by the 
conclusions of Hardin and Schumpeter.  Riker finds that democracy cannot produce 
positive libertyfreedom through self-directionbecause substantive outcomes do not 
consistently reflect public opinion.12  In doing so, Riker rejects claims that democracy 
can contribute to the development of individual moral autonomy, as espoused by Dahl,13 
                                                
10 Hardin, Liberalism , p. 280-5. 
11 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 296; Riker, Liberalism, p. 249-51. 
12 Riker, Liberalism, p. 238-9. 
13 Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1989), p. 105. 
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or to individual personal development, as originally attributed to J. S. Mill.14  Hardin, as 
informed by Downs and Schumpeter, argues that, if individuals cannot be expected to be 
informed enough to vote intelligently, that the democratic direction of government cannot 
contribute to individual autonomy or personal development.15  Hardins argument 
provides a further reason, independent of social choice theory, for concurring with 
Rikers assessment of democracy. 
 The significance of this corroboration becomes apparent when observing 
deliberative democratic critiques of Riker and his contemporaries.  John Dryzek and 
Christian List, in a relatively nuanced deliberative argument, maintain that deliberation 
can reduce the risk of manipulation and create conditionssingle dimensioned 
decisionsin which Condorcet cycling, which results in irrational collective decisions, 
cannot occur.16 Like most, if not all, deliberative theorists, Dryzek and List focus 
exclusively on refuting Rikers application of Arrows theorem, and not on the purpose of 
that refutationadvancing a conception of democracy in which the popular direction of 
government is valued because it has been discussed and agreed to.   
Hardin argues that, because it is rational for individuals to be politically ignorant, 
their collective opinion and agreement cannot be valuable, in and of itself.17  Even if 
Dryzek, List, and other deliberative theorists are correct about Riker and social choice, 
and individual opinions can be aggregated into a rational collective decision, Hardin finds 
that that decisiona substantive outcomecannot normatively justify democracy.  The 
                                                
14 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, Currin Shields, ed. (Indianapolis : 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1958) Chapter 3. 
15 Hardin, Liberalism , p. 170-2. 
16 John Dryzek and Christian List, Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A 
Reconciliation; British Journal of Political Science, 33 (2003), 1-28, p. 27-28. 
17 Hardin, Liberalism , p. 172-3. 
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theories of Hardin, as informed by Schumpeter, and Riker, corroborate and strengthen 
one another by providing independent arguments in favour of the same conclusion. 
The significance of this corroboration becomes apparent when one observes the 
precious few instances in which competing democratic theorists examine the theories of 
Riker and Schumpeter in unison.  Joshua Cohen, an intellectual founder of deliberative 
theory, acknowledges that Schumpeter and Riker belong to an important tradition of 
argument that finds that the ideal of popular self government is incoherent.18  
However, having done so, Cohen fails to recognize Schumpeters unique contributions to 
the tradition; he argues that deliberative institutions can circumvent the problems of 
preference aggregation, as forwarded by Riker, but fails to consider that, as forwarded by 
Schumpeter, the electorate may lack the political awareness to arrive at a coherent 
decision.  In fact, it appears as though Cohen is the only theorist to have recognized the 
necessity of addressing both Schumpeter and Riker when advancing a competing 
normative democratic theory.19  And, although he notes the necessity, and although he 
states that he is not offering a comprehensive refutation, Cohen completely fails to 
address Schumpeters contributions to minimalist democratic theory.   
It is likely that prior to Hardins revitalization of Schumpeters conclusion 
concerning individual political competence, that Schumpeters conception of democracy 
was not considered of pressing significance to normative democratic theory.  And, while 
Schumpeter may have been assumed too antiquated, Hardins democratic theories have 
                                                
18 Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit, eds, The 
Good Polity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989, 17-34), p. 28. 
19 Albert Weale, Democracy (New York: St. Martins Press, 1999), p. 34.  Weale notes that there are 
similarities between Riker and Schumpeter, but does so in a survey of democratic theory and does not 
present arguments in favour of any particular normative conception. 
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been circulating for less than a decade, and have yet to be linked to those of Schumpeter 
and Riker or subjected to scrutiny by detractors of minimalist democratic theory. 
The democratic conceptions of Schumpeter, Riker, and Hardin reach the same 
minimalist conclusionthe normative value of substantive democratic outcomes cannot 
justify the democratic form of government.  Accordingly, as demonstrated above, the 
conclusions of Schumpeter, Riker, and Hardin cannot be considered independently; the 
minimalist conception of democracy cannot be contradicted by refuting one theorist 
independently of the other two. 
The minimalist conception of democracy is far more compelling than its 
detractors recognize.  Minimalist theory is most commonly underestimated when 
opponents of normative social choice theory consider the work of Riker independently 
but disregard the work of Schumpeter, Hardin, and any other hereto unidentified 
minimalists.  This neglect constitutes a serious flaw in deliberative democratic theory, 
and potentially other bodies of normative democratic theory, that must be acknowledged 
and addressed.     
As has been demonstrated, the minimalist conception of democracy is at least as 
valid as competing bodies of theory.  In fact, it may be reasonable to conclude that 
minimalist theory provides a far more realistic valuation of democracy, as it is currently 
practiced, than other normative democratic theories, particularly because Hardin firmly 
grounds minimalist conclusions in political reality.20  Accordingly, not only democratic 
theorists, but those concerned with the creation and structuring of democratic 
                                                
20 Hardin, Liberalism. Hardin is concerned with explaining democracy as it is practiced and concludes that 
it is formed by the forces that structure politics.  
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governments and with democratic decision-making in the worlds functioning 
democracies should be informed by minimalist democratic theory. 
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